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Over the past twenty years, scholars of criminal law, criminology and
criminal punishment have documented a transformation in the practices,
objectives, and institutional arrangements underlying a range of criminal
justice system functions that are at the heart of penal modernism.' In
contrast to the preceding eighty years of criminal justice practices that
were progressively more modern in their belief in the rationality of the
criminal offender and their concern for enhancing civilization through
rehabilitative responses to criminality, these scholars note that since the
mid-1980's the relatively settled assumptions about the framework that
shaped criminal justice and penal practices for nearly a decade were
abruptly thrown into reverse.
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1. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
SocIETY (2001) 53-73; James E. Robertson, Houses of the Dead: Warehouse Prisons, Paradigm
Change, and the Supreme Court, 34 Hous. L. REV. 1003 (1997); James E. Robertson, The Decline of
Negative Implication Jurisprudence: Procedural Fairness in Prison Discipline After Sandin v.
Conner, 32 TULSA L.J. 39 (1996); ELLIOTr CURRIE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1998);
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT AND THE RE-
STRAINT OF CRIME (1995); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE
STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA (2001); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE
SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT (1991); Leena Kurki & Norval Morris, The Purposes, Practices, and
Problems of Supermax Prisons, 28 CRIME & JUST. 385 (2001); R.A. DUFF & DAVID GARLAND (eds.),
A READER ON PUNISHMENT (1994); MARC MAUER, RACE To INCARCERATE (1999); MICHAEL TONRY,
MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995); TARA HERIVAL & PAUL
WRIGHT, PRISON NATION: THE WAREHOUSING OF AMERICA'S POOR (2003); DAVID GARLAND (ed.),
MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (2001); MICHAEL WELCH, PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA: SOCIAL CONTROL AND THE IRONIES OF IMPRISONMENT (1999).
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The introduction to David Garland's latest book, The Culture of Control,
describes how this transformation manifested itself within the criminal
justice system, including its impact on career criminal justice professionals.
Within the brief time it takes to progress from basic training to
mid-career, a whole generation of practitioners - probation officers,
prison officials, prosecutors, judges, police officers, and criminological
researchers - have looked on while their professional world was turned
upside down. Hierarchies shifted precariously; settled routines were
pulled apart; objectives and priorities were reformulated; standard
working practices were altered; and professional expertise was sub-
jected to challenge and viewed with increasing skepticism. The rapid
emergence of new ways of thinking and acting on crime, and the
concomitant discrediting of older assumptions and professional orienta-
tions, ensured that many penal practitioners and academics lived
through the 1980's and 1990's with a chronic sense of crisis, and
professional anomie.'
Immigration practitioners are currently reeling from changes that have
occurred in immigration law and administrative practices that dramatically
undermine practices and objectives that characterized the field as recently as
twenty years ago. Major shifts in policy generated by federal immigration
reform legislation have likewise created a sense of crisis that pervades the
practice of immigration law. The uncertainty produced by sweeping reform
legislation enacted at a rapid pace has confounded attorneys and judges alike
as they struggle to discern applicable legal standards and procedures with a
backlog of cases requiring their urgent attention.4 Likewise, the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, 5 which restructured many government agencies and
subsumed the Immigration and Naturalization Service, left career immigra-
tion officials unsure of the nature and continuity of their employment, and
2. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL 4 (2001).
3. The law and practices that were operative twenty years ago were themselves aberrations in a
centuries-long tradition of harshness toward immigrants that included indefinite detention, summary
exclusion, and discrimination. The changes that have occurred through recent immigration reforms
can be viewed, therefore, as disrupting practices and objectives that stand out against an exception to
a broader background of harsher practices.'Nevertheless, recent immigration reforms have reversed
much of the progress these exceptional practices established in the 1950's, 1960's and 1970's, when it
appeared (at least to some scholars) that immigration law was being permanently realigned to
comport with the constitutional doctrine of the Warren Court and civil rights legislation.
4. Neil A. Lewis, With Immigration Law in Effect, Battles Go On, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 2, 1997, at
AI0 (reporting widespread confusion and anxiety among immigration officials and immigrant
families alike); Linda Greenhouse, Justices Uphold Selective Deporting of Aliens, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
25, 1999, at A22 (reporting "widespread confusion over how to interpret the densely worded,
internally contradictory provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996").
5. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
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under whose authority their administrative units would function.6 The
instability and uncertainty produced by hastily enacted immigration legisla-
tion in the 1980's and 1990's occasioned crises for immigration practitioners
and immigrants.7 However, these reforms were themselves a response to a
sense of crisis that America's borders were out-of-control and its existing
immigration policies were ineffectual and unenforceable. 8
As immigration reforms increasingly enhance the role of law enforcement
and incorporate criminal penalties, the regulation of non-U.S. citizens-
particularly those with criminal convictions in their pasts-has become
intimately involved in crime control. Immigration control is increasingly
adopting the practices and priorities of the criminal justice system. Many
scholars and commentators are describing this unprecedented intimacy as the
"criminalization of immigration law." It has motivated immigration scholars
to document harsh, law enforcement-focused reforms in the treatment of
non-U.S. citizens and the impact of these reforms on immigration procedures
and practices. 9 This scholarship largely documents the reforms and their
consequences in much the same way as crime scholars initially focused on
documenting the fact that a shift in the balance of crime legislation of great
significance had occurred. Although the horrific events of September 11,
2001 immediately produced an urgent new agenda for controlling crime
within immigration law, the reasons underlying such heavy reliance upon
punitiveness within immigration reforms of the 1980's and 1990's are hardly
self-evident.
This paper seeks to clarify why these reforms are taking place, why they
are taking place at this historical juncture, and why they rely heavily on
criminal punitiveness by drawing upon the new penological literature that
6. Tim Weiner, Along Borders, Tension and Uncertainty Prevail, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,2003, at All
(describing tension and confusion among customs officials caused by restructuring of INS). The
internal confusion caused by the elimination of the INS has also confused immigration officials in
other countries. Soon after the breakup of the INS, and the dispersion of its functions across three
different divisions of the Department of Homeland Security, the lines of communication between
foreign immigration officials were reportedly in disarray. Mike Allen, Former INS Head Warns of
Rights Abuses, WASH. POST, June 15, 2003, at A l2.
7. Jim Specht, Panic Spreads as Immigration Deadline Nears, USA TODAY, Mar. 31, 1997, at 3A
(reporting the chaos and panic created by 1996 immigration reforms on the eve of their taking effect).
8. Described by one author as a "beleaguered bureaucracy," the immigration system came under
heavy public criticism in the 1980's and 1990's for a host of inadequacies including lax law
enforcement, a fragmented administrative structure and an absence of clear objectives. These
inadequacies permitted illegal immigration to the level of a large-scale crisis. Immigration reforms
adopted in the 1980's and 1990's were an attempt to ameliorate the crisis. MILTON D. MORRIS,
IMMIGRATION: THE BELEAGUERED BUREAUCRACY 88-93 (1985).
9. Robert Bach, The Progress of lmmigration Reform, in 21 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 7-18 (Lydio
Tomasi ed., 1999); Iris Bennett, The Unconstitutionality of Nonuniform Immigration Consequences
of 'Aggravated Felony' Convictions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1696 (1999); Lenni B. Benson, Back to the
Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV.
1411 (1997); Victoria C. Capitaine, Life in Prison Without a Trial: the Indefinite Detention of
Immigrants in the United States, 79 TEx. L. REV. 769 (2001); Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation and
Justice: A Constitutional Dialogue, 41 B.C. L. REV. 771 (2000); Peter H. Schuck, INS Detention and
Removal: A 'White Paper,' 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 667 (1997).
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seeks to explain the broader significance of changes in crime control
strategies and practices over the past three decades. In doing so, this paper
will clarify the relationship between recent, harsh immigration reforms
adopted both pre- and post-9/11 and the severity revolution within crime
control that has been documented by crime scholars.
II. THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL
In the past two decades, several profound shifts have occurred in the
treatment of immigrants as a result of a perceived "crisis" in immigration
policy that began in the late 1970's and early 1980's. A number of develop-
ments in immigration law and policy attest to a changing landscape of
immigration control. First, we have moved from an era in which courts and
Congress showed a willingness to afford non-U.S. citizens limited proce-
dural and substantive rights to an era in which the rights of non-citizens have
been sharply curtailed. Rights that have been abdicated by recent legislation
include the right to judicial review of discretionary decisions regarding
detention or release,' ° the right to judicial review of a deportation order
against any non-citizen with a criminal conviction for an "aggravated felony"
in his past," and the right to a stay of deportation pending appeal. 12
Second, legal and political tolerance of illegal aliens, including the
willingness to afford them welfare benefits to nominally prevent them from
devolving into a permanent underclass, has given way to a belief that
criminal punishment and expedited removal of illegal aliens through beefed
up law enforcement is the best way to handle illegal immigration.
Third, criminal grounds for deporting non-citizens that were previously
quite limited and enforced with laxity have been greatly expanded in scope
and are now strictly enforced through a variety of mechanisms and institu-
tional arrangements that have produced unprecedented cooperation between
criminal and immigration law enforcement. Thus, immigration detention-
10. Through the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA") and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRAIRA"),
Congress attempted to "strip" the federal courts of the authority to review virtually all immigration
decisions, including deportation and detention orders, by the Attorney General or any of its delegates,
including immigration judges. However, the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the habeas
corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts to review constitutional claims and pure questions of law. See
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996); l.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678 (2001).
11. Congress eliminated federal court review of deportation orders against aggravated felons in
IIRAIRA. However, the federal courts retain habeas corpus jurisdiction over constitutional claims
and questions of law, St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, and circuit courts retain jurisdiction to review
determinations of whether someone was properly deported as an aggravated felon, Xiong v. INS, 173
F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 1999).
12. Prior to the enactment of the IIRAIRA, the filing of a petition for judicial review in the court
of appeals automatically stayed an order of deportation (INA § 106(a)(3)). Under the IIRAIRA, the
filing of a petition for review under INA § 242(a)(1) does not automatically stay execution of the
government's removal order unless the court directs otherwise. AUSTIN FRAGOMEN ET AL., IMMIGRA-
TION LEGISLATION HANDBOOK, § 1:68 1-135 (2002).
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previously reserved for the more dangerous individuals to assure their
appearance at the time and place of deportation-is now so broadly applied
to excludable and deportable aliens that it no longer serves to incapacitate the
most dangerous individuals, but to punish most deportable aliens by confin-
ing them in institutions such as county jails, federal lockups and immigration
service detention facilities. 13 In turn, the exponential growth of the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service ("INS") detained population in excess of
available beds in INS-supervised facilities has increased the participation of
public and private actors in the detention of immigration detainees, resulting
in the commodification of immigration detainees. 14
Fourth, we have moved from an era in which cooperation between the INS
and local and state law enforcement was eschewed to an era in which local
and state police involvement in enforcing "civil" immigration orders is
embraced. Traditionally, such involvement was undesirable for its tendency
to discourage illegal aliens or non-citizens from mixed-status families from
reporting crimes in their communities as well as their own victimization."
Fifth, immigration-seen primarily as a civil rights issue during the Civil
Rights Era spanning the 1960's and 1970's16-is now seen as a critical issue
of national security. ' 7 Immigration law enforcement was once constrained by
the political will to protect refugees and undocumented workers who were
seen as victims of flawed, often racially discriminatory immigration prac-
tices. The American Public now represents the primary victim of flawed
immigration practices; a victim in need of protection from immigrants
draining welfare coffers and failing to culturally assimilate into the white
middle-class. Most recently, the public has been victimized by a religiously
and ethnically constituted group of Muslim and Arab men. As a result, law
enforcement tactics such as racial profiling and preventive detention that
would have shocked the nation twenty years ago are tolerated and even
condoned as a "necessary evil" for the protection of national security.
13. The INS, whose functions were subsumed by the Department of Homeland Security, houses
its detainees in the following types of facilities: its own Service Processing Centers, Federal Bureau
of Prisons facilities, state and local jails, and other contract facilities.
14. Michael Welch, The Role of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the Prison-
Industrial Complex, 27 Soc. JUST. 73 (2000).
15. Additionally, such interagency cooperation-particularly where immigration authority is
delegated to local law enforcement-raises concerns about abuses of power such as police profiling
and harassment of people in border areas who "appear" to be foreign-born, and the inappropriate use
of deportation to make an "end run" around the constitutional protections inherent in the process of
criminal prosecution. Bach, supra note 9.
16. DEBRA DELAET, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY IN AN AGE OF RIGHTS 1 (2000) ("Civil rights have
been a central part of the discourse shaping the debate over U.S. immigration policy since at least the
1960's... [Slince the 1960's, the idea that fairness and non-discrimination should fundamentally
shape U.S. immigration policy has predominated in the immigration policy debate in this country.").
17. Christopher Drew & Adam Liptak, Immigration Groups Fault Rule on Automatic Detention
of Some Asylum Seekers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2003, at BI5 (citing harsh policy of automatically
detaining asylum seekers from Muslim countries as evidence that immigration is being treated more
as an issue of national security than as a social and demographic issue).
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III. LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF THE CRIMINALIZATION OF IMMIGRATION LAW
A. The Criminalization of Immigration Law
The phrase "criminalization of immigration law" has been employed by
practitioners and scholars alike to describe many different aspects of the shift
toward greater criminal punitiveness that has emerged within the past two
decades; most dramatically since the enactment of harsh federal immigration
reforms in 1996. In Zero Tolerance: The Increasing Criminalization of
Immigration Law, '8 practitioner Helen Morris cites the increased prosecution
of immigration violations as federal crimes since the mid-1980's (and the
resulting increase in incarceration of non-citizens for what historically were
civil violations) as well as the harsh immigration consequences for other,
often minor, criminal activity as evidence of the increasing criminalization of
immigration law. In The Criminalization of Immigration Law: Employer
Sanctions and Marriage Fraud,'9 Professor Maria Isabel Medina analyzes
the use of new criminal penalties under the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986 ("IRCA") and the Immigration Marriage Fraud Act of 1986
("IMFA") to discourage and prevent citizens from either assisting aliens to
enter the United States, or from assisting aliens who have already entered the
country to become permanent residents. She asserts that by criminalizing the
employment-based and marital relationships of undocumented persons, the
United States is increasingly looking to the criminal law to address the
problem of illegal immigration. In A New Look at Deportation as Punish-
ment: Why at Least Some of the Constitution's Criminal Procedure Protec-
tions Must Apply,20 immigration attorney Robert Pauw criticizes the harsh
immigration consequence of deportation for a past criminal conviction and
the fiction that deportation is "civil" in nature as obscuring the criminaliza-
tion of immigration law. He argues that in some cases the statutory frame-
work of immigration law is inherently penal, citing the example of a person
convicted of an "aggravated felony" who is deportable without any possibil-
ity of a waiver, even in the most compelling of circumstances. In The
Immigrant as Criminal: Punishing Dreamers,2' Professor Bill Ong Hing
describes the process by which undocumented workers are simultaneously
lured to the United States, then problematized, demonized, dehumanized,
and ultimately criminalized in a manner that "renders punishment of aliens a
18. Helen Morris, Zero 7lerance: The Increasing Criminalization of Immigration Law, 74
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1317, No. 33 (Aug. 29, 1997).
19. Maria Isabel Medina, The Crininalization of Immigration Law: Employer Sanctions and
Marriage Fraud, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669 (1997).
20. Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why At Least Some of the
Constitution's Criminal Procedure Protections MustApply, 5 BENDER'S IMM. BULL. 475, No. I I (June
1,2000).




part of the American psyche." Professor Hing draws upon the history of
immigration law in the United States, but particularly upon reforms within
the past two decades in asserting that immigrants who dare to pursue the
dream that life in the United States represents are treated as criminals even
within the nominally civil immigration system when they are jailed, guarded
and deprived of counsel. While he doesn't specifically employ the term
"criminalization," Professor Daniel Kanstroom argues that a troubling conse-
quence of immigration law reforms of the past fifteen years is "a rather
complete convergence between the criminal justice and deportation sys-
tems."22 His article, Deportation, Social Control and Punishment: Some
Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases,23 the first in a trilogy of
articles on the state of US deportation law, observes that the purposes served
by the deportation of some long-term resident aliens conform to the functions
served by criminal punishment-incapacitation, deterrence and retribution.
From this observation, Kanstroom goes on to question the long-held assump-
tion that the harsh consequence of deportation for some long-term resident
aliens merely constitutes "regulation," rather than punishment, within a
nominally civil deportation system.
Other immigration reforms within the past two decades that have been
cited as evidence of the increasing criminalization of immigration law
include the new policy of detaining and criminally prosecuting asylum-
seekers entering the United States with false documents,24 cooperative
efforts between state law enforcement departments and immigration offi-
cials, 25 and stiff criminal penalties (in addition to deportation) such as
incarceration, heavy fines and forfeiture of property for the act of entry itself,
and for fraud in a variety of contexts.26
The phrase "criminalization of immigration law" has become a general
way of describing the closer relationship that has developed between
immigration law and criminal law, although as the preceding paragraphs
illustrate, it means different things to different people. While immigration
scholars use it to account for a number of recent changes within
immigration law, the phrase tends to emphasize overall the importation of
22. Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1889,
1891 (2000).
23. Id.
24. Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-Loehr, Detaining and Criminalizing Asylum Seekers, 8
IMM. BULL. 764, No. 9 (May 1, 2003) [hereinafter Mailman].
25. See DOJ Legal Opinion Would Broaden Use of State, Local Personnel in Immigration
Enforcement, 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES 519 (2002); Cheryl W. Thompson, INS Role for Police
Considered, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2002, at A15; Susan Sachs, A Nation Challenged: Illegal
Immigrants: Long Resistant, Police Start Embracing Immigration Duties, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2002,
at A 11; INS Signs Agreement with Florida to Authorize State, Local Officers to Perform Inmigration
Enforcement, 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1120, No. 30 (July 29, 2002); INS Issues Final Rule
Authorizing State, Local Immigration Enforcement During 'Mass Influx' of Aliens, 79 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1113.
26. Medina, supra note 19, at 675-76.
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criminal categories, processes and techniques into the regulation of
immigrants. However, from the perspective of crime scholars who tend to
view the burgeoning correctional population of non-U.S. citizens, the
increased criminal prosecution of immigration violations, and other
punitive immigration reforms as expanding the authority of the criminal
justice system, and simultaneously distorting its traditionally adjudicative
function into something more like an administrative police state, the
phrase "criminalization of immigration law" is inadequate. It does not
reflect the interjection of the regulatory, administrative (and inherently
more discretionary) practices of immigration control into the criminal
justice system-the "immigrationization of criminal law," if you will.
Nor does it reflect the linkage of informal (or symbolic) citizenship rights
to a person's criminal history.27 In sum, the "criminalization" of immigra-
tion law fails to capture the dynamic process by which both systems
converge at points to create a new system of social control that draws
from both immigration and criminal justice, but it is purely neither.
The work of Jonathan Simon and other proponents of the "new penology"
describe this process as "governing through crime', 2 8 Derived from the work
of Michel Foucault, Simon's theory is that "crime and punishment have
become the occasions and institutional contexts" for shaping the conduct of
others.29 In other words, we are governed through crime whenever crime and
its punishment become the occasion or the opportunity for exercising power
over others.30 Governing through crime characterizes the recent trend to
increasingly construe problems of regulation as problems of crime, and in
doing so, makes available a whole host of tools and techniques of criminal
punishment that would otherwise be inappropriate and unavailable. Thus, the
increasing salience of crime as a rationale for harsher, more punitive
treatment of immigrants demonstrates how non-U.S. citizens are being
governed through crime.
27. Increasingly, criminals and ex-offenders are facing penalties collateral to their criminal
arrests or convictions that impose barriers to their successful reentry into society. These barriers
uniquely parallel the barriers traditionally faced by individuals who illegally enter the US:
ineligibility to vote or hold political office; ineligibility to obtain certain forms of employment. Like
illegal aliens, a pervasive fear of their criminal history being disclosed makes these ex-convicts
subject to abuse and exploitation. Indeed, it creates a subclass of rightless persons, the very problem
that has prompted immigration reforms affording social welfare benefits to illegal immigrants in the
1980's. "There are people within this country who cannot vote, who cannot hold political office, who
are constantly in fear of a knock on the door, even though that knock may never come, who are in fear
of being stopped on the street, who are in fear of any contact with government officers, who are
abused, taken advantage of, whose rights can be violated on the job, who can be discriminated against
in one way or another. It's just not a healthy thing to have a subclass of that kind in this country."
RICHARD D. LAMM & GARY IMHOFF, THE IMMIGRATION TIME BOMB 45 (1985) (quoting Vernon
Briggs).
28. Jonathan Simon, Megan's Law: Crime and Democracy in Late Modern America, 25 LAW &
Soc. INQUIRY 11I I 1(2000).
29. Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime, in THE CRIME CONUNDRUM: ESSAYS IN JUSTICE
(L. Friedman & G. Fischer eds., 1997).
30. Id. at 5.
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Two related changes in immigration law that emerged within the past two
decades demonstrate how immigrants are being increasingly governed through
crime: (1) greater criminal punitiveness within a nominally civil system of
immigration regulation, and (2) greater criminal consequences for immigra-
tion violations, many of which were previously treated civilly. Despite the
early emphasis on selectively controlling the influx of foreigners with
criminal backgrounds, 3' not until quite recently have immigration and
criminal laws interacted so extensively to accomplish this. While foreign-
born individuals have long been subject to dual sanctions under immigration
law as a result of prior criminal activity or disposition within the criminal
justice system,32 over the past twenty years there has been an unprecedented
growth in the scope of criminal grounds for the exclusion and deportation of
foreign-born non-U.S. citizens, 33 as well as immigration crimes them-
selves.34 In other words, the harsh immigration consequences of criminal
activity such as exclusion and deportation have been expanded, as have the
criminal consequences of immigration violations (many of which were
formerly treated civilly). Today more than twenty-five separate sections of
the Immigration and Naturalization Act specifically proscribe conduct that is
associated with criminal activity or expressly made criminal by statute.35
The priority accorded crime control within immigration law sharply
contrasts with the manner in which legal and illegal immigrants were
regulated just twenty years ago. Immigration law historically regulated crime
to a degree by excluding immigrants with criminal records 36 and deporting
legal entrants who commit crimes soon after admission.37 However, the
degree to which non-citizens have been detained and expelled for criminal
histories since 1988 - without regard to the remoteness of the conviction,
the seriousness of the crime, the length of the alien's residence in the United
States or the hardship imposed upon their families - is unprecedented. So is
31. NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, IMMIGRATION AND CRIMES 1-1 (2002) ("Immigration laws have
consistently imposed harsh sanctions on foreign-born persons who are convicted of crimes associated
with criminal activity. In fact, one of the primary motivations underlying the development of
selective immigration controls was the exclusion of criminals. Many provisions contained in the
immigration statute were enacted precisely to exclude or expel foreign-born persons considered to be
undesirable residents of the United States as a result of their criminal activity.").
32. Id. at 1-2 ("The critical confluence of [immigration and criminal] laws occurs at the point at
which the foreign-born individual becomes subject to dual sanctions on account of his or her
involvement with crime or with the criminal justice system.").
33. KESSELBRENNER & ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW & CRIMES, § 1:6, 1-12, 1-13 (2002)
("Especially since the new 1996 legislation, the INS has been actively pursuing the removal of ever
greater numbers of noncitizens convicted of ever more minor offenses, and the number of noncitizens
removed on criminal grounds has been doubling every year or two.").
34. Id. at § 1-5, 1-11
35. Id. at § 1-5, 1-10.
36. Immigration restrictions enacted by Congress in 1882 excluded convicts and persons likely to
become public charges. KURZBAN'S SOURCEBOOK ON IMMIGRATION I (8th ed.).
37. For example, prior to legislation enacted in 1996, non-citizens legally admitted to the United
States were deportable if they committed a crime of moral turpitude within five years of entry. Id. at
120.
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the degree to which discretion has been removed from immigration judges to
provide equitable relief from the harsh effects of detention and expulsion, as
well as from federal judges to review the removal and detention decisions of
immigration judges.38 Furthermore, the degree to which criminal sanctions
and law enforcement techniques are being used to enforce the civil orders of
immigration officials is unparalleled, as is the degree to which immigration
and criminal law enforcement officials are working cooperatively to regulate
immigration.39
B. Immigration Law During the 1960's, 1970's and Early 1980S
Any discussion of the shift from broader due process and other substantive
rights of non-U.S. citizens in the 1960's, 1970's and early 1980's to more
restrictive constructions of immigrants' rights would be premature without
some explanation of the role of Congress' expansive power to regulate
immigration and the broad discretion of the U.S. Attorney General and his
delegates to shape immigration policy and determine the fate of individual
aliens facing exclusion, detention, and deportation.
Courts have very limited authority to review federal laws regulating
immigration. This is in part a product of Congress' expansive - or plenary
- power to regulate immigration. Although the Constitution delineates no
power to regulate immigration expressly vested in Congress, long ago the
Supreme Court implied Congress' power over immigration.40 Congress'
plenary power has been expansively interpreted by the Supreme Court to
override the claims of individual non-citizens to both procedural and substan-
tive rights. Indeed, the Supreme Court has gone so far as to hold that the
measure of the due process rights of a non-citizen seeking to enter the United
States is whatever procedure authorized by Congress or its delegates.4' In
38. See generally, Matthew J. Droskoski, Criminal Aliens Get Pinched: Sandoval v. Reno,
AEDPA s and IIRAIRA's Effect on Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, 45 VILL. L. REV. 711 (2000); Gerald
L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention and the Removal ofAliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961
(1998); Stephen 0. Kline, Judicial Independence: Rebuffing Congressional Attacks on the Third
Branch, 87 Ky. L. J. 679 (1999).
39. See Mailman, supra note 24.
40. The Supreme Court has implied Congress' power over immigration by reference to the
Naturalization Clause in the Constitution, and to other powers over foreign relations and commerce
enumerated to Congress. In one of the earliest immigration cases, Chae Chan Ping v. United States,
the Supreme Court recognized that the power to exclude non-citizens is inherent in the sovereignty of
the United States and that policies established by Congressional legislation cannot be gainsaid by the
courts. 130 U.S. 581 (1889). Chae Chan Ping was the first in a trilogy of cases in which the Supreme
Court rejected constitutional challenges to the deportation and exclusion of noncitizens. See also,
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) and Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698 (1893).
41. Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 660 (rejecting procedural due process challenge to the exclusion
of a Japanese national because, to noncitizens, "the decisions of executive or administrative officers,
acting within powers expressly conferred by congress, are due process of law." In the words of the
Court, "[iut is not within the province of the judiciary to order that foreigners who have never been
naturalized ... shall be permitted to enter, in opposition to the constitutional and lawful measures of
the legislative and executive branches of the national government." ); United States ex rel. Knauff v.
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other words, Congress determines the full extent of such an alien's constitu-
tional rights. These foundational cases - recognizing the exclusive power of
the political branches of government to regulate non-citizens - are heavily
referenced in even the most current judicial opinions adjudicating the claims
of non-citizens subjected to exclusion, deportation, and detention.42 Bound
by long-standing precedent, the Supreme Court has recognized that it is not
within the judicial power to formulate immigration policy, and that any
grievances arising out of immigration policy are properly addressed to the
political branches of government. 43 During a similar period of international
and foreign policy crises in which immigration reform legislation was
retroactively deporting non-citizens, the Court tracked the language of earlier
plenary power cases when it held that it lacked the power to review a resident
alien's deportation order. The Court stated that "[r]eform in this field must be
entrusted to the branches of the Government in control of our international
relations and treaty-making powers." 44
What is striking to scholars examining the history of the exclusion,
detention, and deportation of immigrants through the lens of penal and
criminal law is how little of immigration law is judicially made. In the
context of criminal law, appeals to state and federal courts challenging the
propriety of police policies and procedures leading to apprehension, deten-
tion, and incarceration are commonplace. Likewise, most serious allegations
of abuse or misconduct in the treatment of prisoners are, in spite of recent
reforms, still judicially reviewable. In contrast, few cases challenging the
exclusion, detention or deportation of non-citizens are decided by the
judiciary. The plenary power doctrine accounts for this in part.45 A competing
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (stating "[wihatever the procedure authorized by Congress is,
it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned").
42. For example, Hall v. I.N.S. cited the Chae Chan Ping case to support the proposition that the
United States, as a sovereign nation, has inherent power to exclude and remove non-citizens. 253 F.
Supp. 2d 244 (D.R.I. 2003). Deutsch v. Turner Corp cited Chae Chan Ping in support of the principal
that power over immigration and foreign affairs is reserved to the federal government. 317 F.3d 1005
(9th Cir. 2003).
43. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588 (1952).
44. Id. at 591.
45. Conversely, it has been suggested that the role of the plenary power doctrine is vastly
overstated. In an article entitled Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, immigration scholar Hiroshi Motomura sug-
gested over a decade ago that too much emphasis has been put on the substantive effects of the
doctrine (denying aliens of an opportunity to vindicate constitutional claims) rather than the more
"fundamental" procedural effects (bridging the gulf between constitutional and subconstitutional
immigration law). 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990). Motomura started with the observation that aliens tend
to get more favorable dispositions when judges interpret statutes, regulations and administrative
guidelines (subconstitutional immigration law) than when judges apply constitutional norms and
principles in considering immigrants' claims. Id. Motomura's theory is that "phantom" constitutional
norms that are not indigenous to immigration law, but that are derived from mainstream public law -
like civil rights law - have actually undermined the plenary power doctrine through statutory
interpretation. Id. Thus, an aberrational relationship between statutory interpretation and constitu-
tional law has developed within immigration law. Id. Motomura contends that two sets of constitu-
tional norms have developed within immigration law. Id. at 607. And although constitutional
immigration law remains formally tethered to the plenary power doctrine through judicial reliance
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explanation is that immigration is regulated by a comprehensive and bureau-
cratic administrative system-like employee benefits or tax law-that insu-
lates all but its most extreme decisions from judicial review.
As the other political branch of the government, the Executive Branch-
through the Attorney General (or perhaps now through the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security)-has great latitude to unilaterally revise
immigration regulations and policies. For example, in the days immediately
following September 1 1th, 2001 the executive branch repeatedly invoked
this authority. In one instance, the Bush Administration unilaterally expanded
its power to detain immigrants without charging them with either criminal or
immigration violations. The Attorney General single-handedly rewrote fed-
eral immigration regulations to expand from 24 hours to 48 hours the length
of time a non-citizen can be detained, and from 48 hours to an unspecified,
indefinite length of time during a national emergency.
46
Although immigration law could, and often did, impose hardships on
excludable and deportable aliens, the regime of the 1960's, 1970's and early
1980's was arguably less punitive than it is today. The U.S. economy was
robust, rates of migration to the U.S. were far lower and public attitudes
toward immigrants were far more welcoming. Immigration law of this period
has been characterized as liberal in its willingness to prioritize the natural
rights of immigrants; 47 humanitarian; family-oriented; service-oriented; 48
even procedurally exuberant. 49 Indeed, the contrasts are stark, yet to charac-
terize this era as a due process "revolution" overstates the fact. Immigrants,
particularly refugees and asylum seekers, enjoyed perhaps the fullest privi-
leges than ever before (or after). Even illegal immigrants were broadly
tolerated on a level that was unprecedented in the modem era.
The grounds for deportation of criminal and illegal aliens were narrower,
the use of detention was less frequent, avenues for relief from detention were
much broader, judicial review of deportation orders was broader, and far
fewer immigration violations were criminally punishable. First, non-citizens
with criminal convictions in their past were deportable for only a limited
category of crimes. For example, for many years prior to 1988, non-citizens
with criminal records were subject to deportation primarily for past convic-
tions of crimes of moral turpitude, trafficking in controlled substances or
conspiring to do so, and certain automatic weapons offenses. Second, aliens
subject to deportation on criminal grounds were subject to detention in a
upon the foundational plenary power cases decided over a century ago, Motomura concludes that the
phantom norms that inform the interpretation of immigration statutes undermine the formal plenary
power doctrine itself. Id. at 549.
46. Philip Shenon & Robin Toner, A Nation Challenged: Policy and Legislation; U.S. Widens
Policy on Detaining Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2001, at Al.
47. PETER SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS AND IN-BETWEENS 50 (1998).
48. See generally Welch, supra note 14.
49. David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community: Political Asylum
and Beyond, 44 U. PInr L. REV. 165, 171 (1983).
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narrow range of circumstances, but were afforded liberal relief from deten-
tion on the basis of a wide range of personal considerations, including the
age, health and elapsed time of detention; and the likelihood that the alien
will resume (or follow) a course of action that would make him deportable. 50
The long-enduring influence of the plenary power doctrine ultimately
limited the success of non-citizens ordered deported or detained who sought
greater procedural or substantive rights. Therefore, it would be misleading to
characterize the 1960's, 1970's and early 1980's as a period in which a due
process "revolution" occurred. It is more accurate to say that against the
restrictive landscape of the plenary power doctrine, federal courts were more
sympathetic to claims arising from the overcrowded and long-term detention
of excludable immigrants, than after the mid-1980's when law enforcement
and criminal sanctions became an INS priority.
The more favorable treatment of non-citizens' claims to rights against
exclusion, deportation and detention in the period immediately preceding the
mid-1980's is illustrated by the federal courts' handling of several different
immigration matters. In espousing his theory that the federal judiciary has
transformed classical immigration law from the Civil Rights Era of the
1950's to the present, Peter Schuck cites some of these examples, among
them: the Supreme Court's affirmation of lower court decisions that a lawful
permanent resident who returns to the U.S. after a brief trip outside the
country is entitled to a due process hearing in spite of the INS's attempt to
summarily exclude her on the theory that she made a new "entry" into the U.S.;
51
and the willingness of some federal courts to read into the deportation process
limitations drawn from constitutionally-derived criminal protections.5
Claims arising from the mass detention of aliens from Cuba, Haiti, El
Salvador and other nations in the Caribbean Basin especially troubled the
federal courts. Due to heavy-handed and arbitrary actions on the part of the
INS and the harsh, abusive conditions to which even some aliens with
colorable claims to legal protections notwithstanding their undocumented
status were subjected, federal courts were more willing to intervene in their
treatment. 53 In a limited number of cases, federal judges intervened to grant
broad class relief to large numbers of detainees, undermining harsh policies
such as the blanket detention of all undocumented aliens unable to establish a
primafacie case for admission, mass deportation of detained Haitian refugees and
mass processing and denial of the asylum claims of Haitian refugees.54
50. ELIZABETH J. HARPER, THE IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 612-13 (3d ed. 1975).
51. See SCHUCK, supra note 47.
52. Such as Fourth Amendment privacy, Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers Union v. Sureck, 681
F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1982) and the right to counsel, Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 369 n.3
(6th Cir. 1975). See SCHUCK, supra note 47, at 62.
53. Id. at 64.
54. Id. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (11 th Cir. 1982).
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C. The Increasing Prioritization of Law Enforcement from the late 1980's
to the Present
The legal regulation of immigration in the 1950's, 1960's and 1970's is
considered by scholars across disciplinary boundaries to have been an era of
relative (albeit exceptional) liberalism, easing the immigration restrictionism
of the preceding several decades.55 Michael LeMay refers to this period as
the "Dutch Door" Era,56 one that reflected, among other things, the influence
of the Civil Rights Movement in changing in national attitudes toward race
and racially restrictive immigration policies.57 Immigration restrictionists
attribute liberal immigration policies of this era to, inter alia, pro-alien court
decisions by liberal federal judges. Immigration policy of this era generally
favored family reunification for naturalized citizens and lawful permanent
residents, 58 broader admission of refugees accompanied by public subsidy
and resettlement benefits, 59 and limited due process protections for some
illegal aliens.6 °
Such liberal immigration policies could not be made in the absence of
other, extra-legal factors. By the mid 1960's, the U.S. had experienced a long
period of low immigration and low unemployment, and the economy was
strong. By the mid-1970's the U.S. had withdrawn its troops from Vietnam,
touching off a refugee crisis as the US evacuated over 100,000 South
Vietnamese government officials, soldiers and others who had supported the
U.S. in the war against the Viet Cong.61 With long-standing precedent
favoring the acceptance of refugees from Communist countries, the U.S.
response was legislative authorization of generous resettlement assistance,
language and vocational training, and medical care for the refugees. 62 By the
late 1970's refugee admission and assistance was significantly expanded,
55. DEBRA L. DELAET, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY IN AN AGE OF RIGHTS 2 (2000) ("[Tihe
fundamental legislative changes to U.S. immigration policy from the 1960's through the 1980's have
been comprised of largely liberal measures that have contributed to an increase in immigration to this
country."). NORMAN ZUCKER & NAOMI ZUCKER, DESPERATE CROSSINGS: SEEKING REFUGE IN AMERICA
32 (1996) (describing the passage of immigration legislation that ended the racially and ethnically
discriminatory national origins quota system in mid-1960's as the "beginning of the era of
liberalization").
56. LeMay contends that the Dutch Door Era (1950-80) marked the first time in the twentieth
century that immigration restrictions were relaxed, representing a new phase in immigration policy.
MICHAEL LEMAY, FROM OPEN DOOR TO DUTCH DOOR 103 (1987).
57. Id. at 110.
58. Largely through the provisions of the Immigration Act of 1965, which overturned the national
origins quota system and established a preference system that sought to preserve immigrant families
and reunite separated families. id. at 111-12. See also MORRIS, supra note 8, at 55.
59. JAMES G. GIMPEL & JAMES R. EDWARDS, THE CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION
REFORM 120 (1999). See also LEMAY, supra note 56, at 114-115.
60. SCHUCK, supra note 47, at 64-65 (criticizing judicial granting of rights to illegal aliens,
particularly undocumented detainees: "the courts have transmuted classical immigration law's
conception of the nature of the government-alien relationship into a rather different one in which
rights against the government accrue to aliens without the government's consent and without the
formal conditions for immigration having been observed").
61. GIMPEL & EDWARDS, supra note 59, at 119-20.
62. Id. at 120.
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culminating in the Refugee Act of 1980.63 The Act established a new quota
for refugees independent of family reunification-based and business-oriented
visa quotas, thereby eliminating limits on refugee admissions established
under the 1965 preference system.64 The Refugee Act also appropriated a
supplemental $100 million for emergency refugee resettlement assistance.6 5
One prominent immigration scholar has argued that by changing the defini-
tion of "refugee, ' 66 the 1980 legislation increased the number of individuals
eligible for refugee status from 3 million to nearly 13 million 67 by broaden-
ing the category of refugee from those fleeing communism or the Middle
East to anyone with a well-founded fear of persecution due to race, religion,
nationality, membership in a social group or political opinion.68 Also passed
in the same congressional session was legislation reauthorizing public
assistance and educational services for refugees from Cuba, Haiti and
Indochina.69 In the early 1980's, a confluence of factors, including post-
industrial economic decline, skyrocketing unemployment, the ascendancy of
right-wing political conservatism, negative public attitudes toward the dra-
matic increase of legal immigration made possible by legislative changes in
1965 and 1980, and trepidation about rising illegal immigration, contributed
to a fundamental shift in policy toward legal and illegal immigration.70
Public sentiment around immigration changed dramatically from a willing-
ness to absorb and generously resettle refugees and tolerance of illegal
immigration to a growing sense of crisis that the United States had "lost
control of its borders" and that U.S. immigration policy was dangerously
adrift. 7 ' The War on Drugs focused attention on the inability of the customs
63. See generally Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980)
64. GIMPEL & EDWARDS, supra note 59, at 130; see also GIL LOESCHER & JOHN SCANLAN,
CALCULATED KINDNESS: REFUGEES AND AMERICA'S HALF-OPEN DOOR, 1945 TO THE PRESENT 154
(1986).
65. GIMPEL & EDWARDS, supra note 59, at 130.
66. SIMCOX, U.S. IMMIGRATION IN THE 1980'S: REAPPRAISAL AND REFORM 52 (1988).
67. LEMAY, supra note 56, at 121 (citing ARNOLD LEIBOVITZ, THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980:
PROBLEMS AND CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS, ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND
SOCIAL SCIENCE 163-71 (1983)).
68. HELEN HAYES, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE UNDOCUMENTED: AMBIVALENT LAW,
FURTIVE LIVE 19 (2001).
69. GIMPEL & EDWARDS, supra note 59, at 130.
70. This brief summary greatly condenses and simplifies events that were more far nuanced.
It is widely thought that while Congress moved toward tighter limits on immigrant access to
public benefits, the federal courts continued to liberalize federal entitlements for refugees and
illegal immigrants through judicial opinions in such cases as Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)
(requiring states to provide free public education to children of illegal aliens), Lewis v. Gross
(1986) (requiring California's public universities to enroll illegal aliens at in-state tuition rates)
and Berger v. Hechler, 771 F.2d 1556 (2d Cir. 1985) (prohibiting federal agencies from amending
a mistaken policy of distributing Supplemental Security Income (SSI) to illegal aliens). See
SIMCOX, supra note 66, at 38.
71. This sense of crisis is reflected in the public admission of Attorney General William French
Smith that the US was "unable to control its borders." Plan on IllegalAliens to be Disclosed Soon by
the Administration, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1981, at 31 (reporting Mr. Smith's statement at a meeting of
the Florida Bar Association that "[w]e have lost control of our own borders. We have lost control of
not only the number, but also the type of persons who enter the country"). See also THE SELECT
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and immigration services to prevent contraband and foreign drug couriers
from crossing U.S. borders.72 These inadequacies within the Immigration
and Naturalization Service coupled with the emerging role of the U.S. border
as a "crime scene" encouraged Congress to resort to the use of criminal
penalties and enhanced law enforcement to staunch the flow of both contra-
band and illegal immigration across the border.
The shift from more benevolent to harsher attitudes toward legal and
illegal immigration-what Senator Alan Simpson referred to as "compassion
fatigue" 73 -- came about as a result of several factors including: the expense
of resettling close to a million Southeast Asian refugees after 1975,74 and the
growing reality of persistent welfare dependency and heavy clustering in a
few key regions;75 burgeoning numbers of Mexicans surreptitiously crossing
the border and entering the United States illegally after Mexico's economic
collapse in 1983;76 rising public concern about the criminality of illegal
immigrants and refugees arising from reports of high crime rates-
particularly drug-related crimes-among Miami's Mariel boatlift refugees
and complaints from local officials in the Southwest about increased crime
and drug smuggling among illegal aliens;77 and rising social and political
resistance to bilingualism and multilingualism. 78 This series of developments
and trends since the mid-1970's highlighted to the public the disorderliness
of the government's handling of immigration and emphasized the social costs
of a compassionate response to mass immigration from poor countries while
the social benefits became less clea. 79
COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, MARCH 1, 1981 FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS 10, 12 (1981) [hereinafter SELECT COMM'NJ.
72. See generally PETER ANDREAS, BORDER GAMES: POLICING THE U.S.-MEXICO DIVIDE (2000)
(analyzing law enforcement efforts to control the U.S. borders and their focus on drugs and illegal
immigrants) and Kevin R. Johnson, U.S. Border Enforcement. Drugs, Migrants, and the Rule of Law,
47 VILL. L. REV. 897, 898 (2002) (describing how drug and immigration enforcement are "inextrica-
bly linked").
73. SIMCox, supra note 66, at 3.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 4. For an intriguing discussion of the growing association of undocumented immigrants
and criminality during the early 1990's, see KENT A. ONO & JOHN M. SLOOP, SHIFTING BORDERS:
RHETORIC, IMMIGRATION AND CALIFORNIA'S PROPOSITION 187 32-34 (2002).
77. SiMCox, supra note 66.
78. Id. at 4.
79. According to some political scientists, refugee admissions radically changed the generally
supportive Congressional posture toward immigration by linking immigration policy to (income)
redistributive policy at the national level. Prior to the late 1970's, immigrant assistance from the
federal government was uncommon. However, unprecedented flows of new and desperately poor
refugees in the late 1970's generated a host of aggressive federal spending and a new agency within
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), "the nation's largest welfare bureaucracy"
to which conservatives responded with staunch opposition. GIMPEL & EDWARDS, supra note 59, at
132-34, 144. See generally DAVID M. REIMERS, UNWELCOME STRANGERS: AMERICAN IDENTITY AND
THE TURN AGAINST IMMIGRATION (1998).
The persistent, but overlooked problem of visa overstayers came to light in 1979 when student
demonstrations led President Carter to order the deportation of some 60,000 Iranian students. INS
was unable to locate most of them due to poor recordkeeping. SIMCox, supra note 66 at 46.
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While the economic and cultural costs of absorbing illegal aliens crossing
the Mexican border and resettling Southeast Asian refugees began to turn the
tide of American compassion for new immigrants, the mass migration of
Cubans who flooded South Florida via the Florida Straits in the Spring of
1980, penniless and without authorization to enter the country, was the straw
that broke the camel's back.80 The Mariel Cubans were an influx of illegal
aliens who arrived in the United States by boat from about April to
September of 1980. Frequently referred to as the Fifth Wave of Cuban
migration, the Mariel Cubans were an influx of poor and working class
Cubans launched from Mariel Harbor in a ploy by Fidel Castro to undermine
the political currency of the U.S. government's claim that Cubans were
desperate to escape Communism and were trapped in Cuba by a ruthless
dictator. On April 20, 1980, Castro opened Mariel Harbor to hundreds of
boats piloted by Cuban exiles arriving to take friends and relatives back to the
United States "illegally" and to makeshift boats and rafts filled with those
wishing to leave Cuba. Declaring that "anybody who wishes to go to any
other country where he is received, good riddance,' Castro hoped to
embarrass the Carter Administration by creating a chaotic, disorderly flood of
illegal immigration from Cuba while appearing to be grandiose. It worked.
Nearly nine thousand Cubans arrived in Key West on the first two days, and
thousands continued to arrive daily in a wave of immigration that would
exceed 120,000.82
The imposition of criminal sanctions for conduct that previously amounted
to civil violations-in other words, the creation of new categories of criminal
offenses-was not the inevitable consequence of compassion fatigue. How-
ever, the legislative will to criminalize certain kinds of immigration-related
conduct correlates closely to a crisis of legitimacy that immigration policy
experienced after 1975-acutely so after the 1980 Mariel Boatlift-as well
as the popularity of "tough on crime" measures already well underway in the
same legislative arena.83
80. LAMM AND IMHOFF, THE IMMIGRATION TIME BOMB 229 ("Until the Mariel Boatlift there was no
single precipitating crisis that alerted and energized the public."); SIMcOx, supra note 66 at 3.
("Probably no event of the period did more to crystallize these concerns (about the social costs of
immigration, its magnitude and its apparent imperviousness to government control) than the 1980
Mariel Boatlift.").
81. FELIX MASUD-PILOTO, FROM WELCOMED EXILES TO ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS: CUBAN MIGRATION
TO THE U.S. 1959-95 85 (1996).
82. Id. at 92.
83. The fact that crime control reforms were being debated and adopted by Congress at the same
time Congress was confronting crises of illegal immigration contributed to the cross-fertilization
between crime and immigration reform. "Tough on crime" measures that were being debated and
adopted by Congress and state legislatures as early as the 1970's included determinate sentencing,
mandatory minimum sentencing, "three strikes" laws, harsh sentences for "career criminals," tough
juvenile sanctions, and the adoption of numerous death penalty statutes at the state and federal levels.
See generally, MAUER, supra note 1, at 50-80.
Indeed, the philosophical shift on immigration policy Senator Simpson referred to as "compassion
fatigue" reflects a parallel shift in crime policy promoted by the Reagan Administration in the 1980's.
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Disrespect for the rule of law was at the center of the crisis. Mexican
immigrants were breaching the Southern Border by evading (and in some
instances attacking) Border Patrol Agents, intent on securing work opportuni-
ties within the United States. Waves of Haitians, Cubans and other Caribbean
Basis nationals desperately fleeing conditions in their home countries in-
vaded the Florida Straits via boats, rafts and whatever would float without
access to, or regard for, the processes for obtaining legal status to enter the
United States.
The Mariel Boatlift represented a particularly offensive disrespect for the
rule of U.S. immigration law. Castro's rumored purging of thousands of Cuban
inmates and mental patients dispatched by the boatload to the Florida Straits
where they would receive favored refugee treatment under existing immigra-
tion law gave many the impression that "a fraying American immigration policy
was being made not in Washington, but in a foreign land."84 Indeed a report
of the Select Committee on Immigration and Refugee Policy appointed by
President Carter in 1979 reported to President Reagan in 1981 that:
In recent months, we have received a large number of letters 'from
people who complain that immigration policy is out of control.' They
are right. Now undocumented aliens come to the United States in large
numbers ... By permitting our laws to be flouted, we bring immigration
policy as a whole into disrespect and, more important in the long run,
we undermine respect of law, the foundation of a free society.85
To many proponents of greater immigration restrictionism in the 1980's
and 1990's, immigrants-particularly illegal immigrants-were inextricably
Reagan's "get tough" approach to crime control was motivated, as Mauer points out, by his belief that
"big government" could not solve intractable social problems. Reagan shifted the blame onto
individuals who he believed were "responsible for their own destiny in this land of opportunity." Id.
at 60. The legislative response to "compassion fatigue"-criminalization of immigration-related
conduct that was previously discouraged through civil sanctions-similarly averted its eyes from the
roles society and the economy play in encouraging illegal immigration and focused upon the
immigrant as the object of scorn and punishment. This excerpt from a 1982 speech on crime policy
delivered by President Reagan is as applicable to his views on immigration policy as it was to crime
policy as the time:
[The American People] utterly reject.., utopian presumptions about human nature that see
man as primarily a creature of his material environment. By changing this environment
through expensive social programs, this philosophy holds that government can permanently
change man and usher in an era of prosperity and virtue. In much the same way, individual
wrongdoing is seen as the result of poor socioeconomic conditions or an underprivileged
background. This philosophy suggests in short that there is crime or wrongdoing, and that
society, not the individual, is to blame.
Id. In this speech, President Reagan rejects the New Deal "Great Society" program for the domestic
poor as unequivocally as he does for illegal immigrants, and in doing so, justifies more punitive
measures toward both.
84. SIMcox, supra note 66, at 3.
85. From a Report by the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy by Its
Chairman, the Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1980, at A22; SELECT COMM'N,
supra note 71, at 10, 12 (1981) (emphasis added).
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linked to the crisis of crime that was transforming American cities.86 Peter
Brimelow wrote that "immigration is not the only cause of crime. It may not
even be the major cause of crime. But it is afactor.'' 87 Restrictionists strongly
associate both legal and illegal immigration with a new wave of organized
ethnic crime, including Asian gangs, the Russian Mafia and Colombian drug
rings. 88
With a changed perspective on immigration that unsympathetically viewed
illegal aliens as lawbreakers, Congress marshaled in its "war" on illegal
immigration many of the same resources it was already deploying in its war
on drugs. 89 Congress' willingness to add the tools of crime control to its
"arsenal" of weapons to fight illegal immigration led to the passage of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, imposing unprecedented
criminal penalties upon employers who hired illegal aliens. David Simcox
characterizes the legislation as "American immigration's watershed event in
the 1980's. ' '90 Supported by organized labor, but opposed by a powerful
agribusiness lobby, employer sanctions had been on the congressional
backbumer since 1972. Employer sanctions finally passed with growing
recognition that the floodgates of illegal immigration were only opening
wider and the consensus that the problem was not just a labor problem or an
agricultural problem, but a much deeper, intractable problem for a broad
spectrum of interest groups.
1. IRCA of 1986
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 19869' was the first legisla-
tion in a series of immigration reforms that sanctioned the broader use of
86. Peter Brimelow, an ardent and vocal crusader for immigration restrictionism since the 1980's,
cited the high percentage of illegal aliens within the criminal alien population as evidence of how the
U.S. lost control over its borders. PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S
IMMIGRATION DISASTER 183 (1995). Indeed there is a tendency to collapse illegal aliens and criminal
aliens into a single category of dangerous immigrants. Wayne Lutton and John Tanton commented
that "[A]II illegal aliens show at least some propensity for crime by their very presence, possible only
through the violation of at least one law." WAYNE LUTTrON AND JOHN TANTON, THE IMMIGRATION
INVASION 61 (1994).
87. BRIMELOW, supra note 86, at 182. Brimelow also argues that the media have suppressed
information about the links between crime and America's "Second Great Wave of Immigration"
including a large population of non-citizens in US prisons and jails and a high rate of criminal
recidivism and illegal reentry among deportable aliens. Id. at 182-83.
88. DAVID M. REIMERS, UNWELCOME STRANGERS: AMERICAN IDENTITY AND THE TURN AGAINST
IMMIGRATION 79-81 (1998) (describing how immigration critics in the 1980's and 1990's perceived
the American Immigration System as broken as a result of lax criminal screening of aliens seeking
admission and insufficient assimilation of admitted aliens) (citing John Tanton & Wayne Lutton,
Immigration and Criminality in the U.S.A., 18 J. Soc. POL. ECON. STUD. 217 (1993); FAIR,
Immigration-Related Crime Wave Hits America's Heartland, FAIR IMMIGRATION REPORT (June
1996); BRIMELOW, supra note 86, at 185-86. For a general discussion of contemporary foreign crime
syndicates and U.S. immigration, see LUTTON & TANTON, supra note 86, at 61-84.
89. See SIMCox, supra note 66, at 3.
90. Id.
91. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
President Reagan signed the IRCA into law on November 6, 1986.
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criminal penalties for immigration-related conduct and beefed up enforce-
ment of immigration law. There were four major provisions of the legislation:
employer sanctions, increased immigration law enforcement, an amnesty
program for certain undocumented aliens and special provisions relating to
foreign agricultural workers.92
(a) Employer sanctions
One striking aspect of the IRCA, particularly when viewed in light of
criminal penalties imposed in later legislation, is that employers-not illegal
aliens-were singled out for punishment. It was widely believed that em-
ployer sanctions would discourage illegal immigration by turning off the "job
magnet" that lured illegal aliens across the border.93 Under the IRCA's
employer sanctions provisions, employers were prohibited from hiring,
recruiting or referring for a fee non-citizens known to be unauthorized to
work in the United States. The IRCA requires all employers to complete the
Employment Eligibility Verification Form (1-9) for all employees, including
examining employees' papers, verifying their identity and employment
status, and making a good faith effort to determine whether the documents
appear to be genuine.94 Employers who violate the law are subject to a series
of civil fines and to criminal penalties, including incarceration, when there is
a pattern or practice of violations.
(b) Enhanced law enforcement
The enforcement provisions of the IRCA are likewise considered to be an
innovation.95 Prior to the passage of the IRCA, eleven states and one city had
adopted employer sanctions that were not enforced. In contrast, the fines and
penalties imposed under the IRCA were expected to successfully discourage
employment of illegal aliens because of the enforcement resources allocated
in the legislation. The IRCA sought to prevent and deter illegal border
crossing by recommending increases in inspection and enforcement. It
further authorized an increase in Border Patrol appropriations in fiscal years
1987 and 1988 of fifty percent above the fiscal year 1986 level.96 An
92. The amnesty provisions addressed the interests of ethnic and labor lobbies. Western growers
and secondary market employers sought the quid pro quo of guarantees of other routes to seasonal
laborer in exchange for employer sanctions. HAYES, supra note 68, at 48.
93. It is broadly acknowledged that the IRCA ultimately failed to achieve its goal of restricting
illegal immigration. Although data suggest that there may have been a short-term decline in the
number of undocumented workers residing in the US immediately following the IRCA's passage, the
decline has been attributed to the IRCA's legalization provisions. In the long run, the IRCA failed to
decrease the flow of undocumented workers into the U.S. or to alter employers' hiring practices.
DELAET, supra note 55, at 60-63.
94. FRANCISCO L. RIVERA-BATIZ, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY REFORM IN THE 1980's: A PRELIMI-
NARY ASSESSMENT 20-21 (1991).
95. Id. at 5.
96. Id. at 21.
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additional enforcement measure was mandatory state participation in an
automated on-line system to verify instantly an alien's immigration status:
INS' Systematic Alien Verification Entitlement ("SAVE") system. All states
are required to use the system to prevent fraudulent acquisition of public
benefits unless they can demonstrate that it would not be cost-effective.
The law enforcement and crime provisions of the IRCA that shocked
commentators at the time pale in comparison to the legislative measures
taken in 1996 to further strengthen the enforcement of immigration law and
control crime through immigration reforms. Indeed, as one immigration
attorney noted, immigration law reforms adopted in the decade that began
with the IRCA of 1986 are striking for their increased criminalization of
immigration law.9 7 The crisis of legitimacy surrounding U.S. immigration
law that led to tougher law enforcement measures and the use of criminal
sanctions in the IRCA of 1986 yielded to a renewed sense of crisis that lead
Congress to take Draconian measures against undesirable, "criminal" aliens a
decade later.
The increasing employment of criminal law ideologies and practices in the
past two decades falls within two principal categories: (1) greater criminal
punitiveness within a nominally civil system of immigration regulation; and
(2) greater criminal consequences for immigration violations, many of which
were previously treated civilly. I will discuss each in turn.
IV. GREATER GREATER CRIMINAL PUNITIVENESS WITHIN A NOMINALLY CIVIL
SYSTEM OF IMMIGRATION REGULATION
Criminal punitiveness within the immigration system is most apparent in
the case of deportation and detention. Deportation refers to the expulsion of a
non-citizen upon the administrative finding that he is no longer entitled to
remain in the United States.98 The shift toward greater punitiveness within
97. Morris, supra note 18.
98. The AEDPA and the IIRIRA altered the concept of deportation, collapsing both deportation
and exclusion into the broader category of "removal." See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 § 304(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (1996). For the purposes of this article I have
chosen to use the old terminology due to the interdisciplinary nature of this article and the familiarity
of the broader audience I hope to reach with the older terminology. Deportation was traditionally
contrasted with exclusion, the expulsion of an alien who has not been administratively declared
eligible to enter the United States. One significant difference between exclusion and deportation
rested on a legal fiction-the "entry fiction"-that an alien who is physically within the U.S. could be
treated as if he or she was outside the country for constitutional purposes. Once the alien was deemed
to have entered, he or she was granted limited constitutional rights. This legal fiction justified treating
deportable aliens differently from excludable aliens. Excludable aliens have almost no rights,
whereas deportable aliens were afforded somewhat more extensive rights. The entry fiction was
dispensed with in 1996 when Congress collapsed exclusion and deportation proceedings into a single
proceeding known as "removal." Id. The concept of "admission" replaced the concept of "entry".
Aliens who have not been admitted to the U.S. are subject to removal on grounds of inadmissibility.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1952). Aliens who have been admitted to
the US are subject to removal only on grounds of deportability. Id. at § 237. For a brief, basic
explanation of how the 1996 legislation eliminated the concept of "entry" and replaced it with
"admission," see FRAGOMEN, supra note 12, at I- 11, 1-12 (2002).
2003]
GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL
the framework of a nominally civil system of immigration regulation is
apparent in changes in the law regarding deportation for all immigrants.
However, Congress has given the deportation of those non-citizens with
criminal convictions in their past, and, more recently, terrorism suspects, the
highest priority. Consequently, the most criminally punitive treatment with
the fewest avenues for relief has been reserved for non-citizens with criminal
convictions in their pasts and those suspected of ties with organized terrorism.
A. Criminal Aliens
The term "criminal alien" 99 refers to a non-United States citizen with a
criminal conviction in his or her past. Although the term itself has taken on a
nefarious connotation, the state of being a non-citizen with a past criminal
conviction has grave immigration consequences only if the crime for which
the non-citizen was convicted triggers the deportation power of the INS.
Immigration law has long provided for the deportation of criminal aliens who
commit particular types of crimes. However, within the past two decades the
range of crimes for which a criminal alien can be deported has expanded
exponentially. Coupled with more aggressive apprehension and detention of
criminal aliens on the part of INS law enforcement, deportation statistics
have risen steeply.'00 In addition to expanding the grounds for deporting
criminal aliens, recent legislation has mandated detention of deportable
criminal aliens, limited the grounds for relief from detention and deportation,
limited federal judicial review of detention and deportation orders, and
applied the broader range of deportable crimes retroactively to crimes for
which deportation was not a consequence previously.
B. Deportation for Crimes of Moral Turpitude
Crimes for which criminal aliens may be deported are roughly classified
into three groups: crimes of moral turpitude, aggravated felonies and other
more offense-specific crimes. The broadest category of criminal activity for
which a criminal alien may be deported is a crime of "moral turpitude."
Although somewhat amorphous and ambiguous in scope, a crime of moral
turpitude is generally understood to mean a crime involving an act that is
intrinsically or morally wrong or reprehensible, rather than merely statutorily
prohibited.10 ' Crimes such as murder, robbery, kidnapping, voluntary man-
99. The term "criminal alien" only recently came into vogue. Prior to the 1980's "convicted
aliens" was more often used to refer to non-citizens with criminal convictions in their pasts.
100. The number of non-citizens deported from the U.S. as a result of criminal convictions grew
from 1,000 in 1984 to over 55,000 in 1998. Anna Maria Gallagher, Immigration Consequences of
Criminal Convictions: Protecting Your Clients Immigration Interests in Criminal Proceedings, IMM.
BRIEFINGS, No. 01-4, 2 (2001).
101. DAN KESSELBRENNER & LORY D. ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW AND CRIMES § 1:7, 1-14
(1984); IRA KURZBAN, KURZBAN'S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 49 (8th ed. 2002), citing Matter of
Franklin, 20 I&N Dec. 867,868 (BIA 1994), aff'd 72 F.3d 571 (8"h Cir. 1995).
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slaughter, child abuse, and assault with intent to inflict serious bodily injury
have traditionally been considered moral turpitude crimes. Prior to 1996, a
criminal alien who committed a crime of moral turpitude was deportable if:
(1) the crime was committed within five years of entry and a sentence of one
year or more of confinement was actually imposed, or (2) two crimes of
moral turpitude, not arising out of the same criminal scheme, are committed
at any time after entry regardless of the sentence imposed. After 1996,
criminal conviction of a crime for which a sentence of one year of more may
be imposed is sufficient to trigger deportation. Thus a light sentence, which
may reflect mitigating circumstances surrounding the defendant's guilt, will
nonetheless trigger harsh immigration consequences. Furthermore, after
1996, a sentence refers to a time of incarceration or confinement ordered by a
court, even if the time of confinement is suspended or the execution is
withheld. 0
2
Prior to 1986, in addition to moral turpitude crimes, criminal aliens could
be deported for crimes involving controlled substances and certain weapons
offenses.' °3 In reality, deportation proceedings were rarely commenced.
Since the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") provided, with narrow
exceptions, that non-citizens who are incarcerated could not be deported until
they were released from prison, lack of resources and infrastructure to track
down deportable criminal aliens and enforce their deportation orders resulted
in the deportation of only a fraction of criminal aliens. ' 0
4
C. Aggravated Felons
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 created a new category of crimes for
which a criminal alien could be deported. This new category of crimes-
"aggravated felonies"-included murder, drug trafficking and firearms traf-
ficking crimes. Most of the drug and firearms crimes previously covered by
the statute, crimes of moral turpitude and other crimes were included under
the re-definition of aggravated felony. 105
The scope of crimes defined as aggravated felonies has continued to grow
in waves of subsequent legislation. Virtually every major piece of immigra-
tion legislation since 1988 has expanded the definition of "aggravated
102. KURZBAN, supra note 101 at 119-20.
103. Specifically, a conviction within five years after the date of entry for a crime of moral
turpitude with a sentence of at least one year in prison; a conviction at any time after entry for two
crimes of moral turpitude, regardless of the sentence; a conviction at any time after entry for violation
of a controlled substance law; or a conviction at any time after entry for unlawful possession of an
automatic weapon. Peter Shuck & John Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls and
Promises of Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 367, 386-7 (1999).
104. Margaret Taylor & Ronald Wright, The Sentencing Judge as Immigration Judge, 51 EMORY
L.J. 1131, 1134-35 (2002).
105. Schuck & Williams, supra note 103, at 388.
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felony." 0 6 The significance of the exponential growth of aggravated felonies
is threefold. First, the degree of severity of crimes considered "aggravated
felonies" has lost a clear, rational connection to the nefarious connotation it
has in the criminal law. Immigration law now defines certain types of
criminality more broadly than the criminal law. Second, the deportation
consequences for criminal aliens convicted for aggravated felonies are quite
severe. Any non-citizen convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after
admission is deportable, frequently without regard to the length of the
sentence imposed or that may be imposed. Third, since the Illegal Immigra-
tion Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA") applied the
amended definition of an aggravated felony retroactively,"°7 many more
criminal aliens became subject to the more severe consequences reserved for
aggravated felons. The impact of retroactivity has been that non-citizens
including long-term legal permanent residents (LPRs) who committed rela-
tively minor crimes long ago are being deported with virtually no legal
recourse for past offenses that were not deportable crimes at the time of
conviction. In addition to offending established precedent against reading
statutes retroactively, it precludes a criminal alien's successful rehabilitation
from consideration in the detention and deportation process. 08
The Immigration Act of 1990 expanded the definition of "aggravated
felonies" to crimes of violence for which the sentence is at least five years."09
Four years later, the Immigration and Technical Corrections Act expanded
the definition to include additional firearms and explosives offenses, some
theft or burglary offenses, some types of fraud, prostitution and a few other
offenses.' 0 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA") expanded the scope of existing aggravated felonies related to
gambling, transportation for purposes of prostitution, alien smuggling, pass-
port fraud, and other forms of document fraud. The Act expanded the
definition to include new offenses involving: obstruction of justice, perjury
or bribery offenses for which a sentence of at least five years or more may be
imposed; commercial bribery, forgery, counterfeiting and vehicle trafficking
offenses for which a sentence of at least five years or more may be imposed;
offenses committed by an alien ordered previously deported; and offenses
relating to skipping bail for which a sentence of two or more years may be
106. Juan P. Osuna, Criminal Aliens and Terrorists, in UNDERSTANDING THE 1996 IMMIGRATION
ACT, 4-2 (1st ed. 1997).
107. The IIRIRA provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law," the amended
definition of aggravated felony applies regardless of whether the conviction was entered before, on or
after the date of enactment of the Act (September 30, 1996). Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, § 321(b).
108. The diminishing importance of rehabilitation is a familiar theme within crime control
reforms of the 1980's as well. For a recent commentary on the irony of life-without-parole, or
so-called "natural life" sentences, see Daniel Bergner, When Forever is Far Too Long, N.Y. TIMES,
June 17, 2003, at A27.
109. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990).




Five months later, the IIRIRA not only expanded the definition of aggra-
vated felonies once again to include new offenses such as rape and sexual
abuse of a minor, but it also lowered the sentence length and monetary
amount thresholds involved in many crimes defined as aggravated felonies.
For example, the IIRIRA lowered the amount of funds involved in a money
laundering crime to be considered an aggravated felony from $100,000 to
$10,000 and lowered to one year the sentence length required for many
"crimes of violence" and theft offenses to be considered aggravated felo-
nies.' 12
D. Deportation for Other Offense-Specific Crimes
Although non-citizens convicted of aggravated felonies and crimes of
moral turpitude make up the vast majority of deportable aliens, the AEDPA,
IIRIRA and various other statutes enacted since the mid-1980's subject
non-citizens convicted of a variety of other types of crimes-most notably
terrorism-related crimes-to apprehension, detention and deportation.
After September 11, 2001, non-U.S. citizen terrorism suspects joined
criminal aliens on the INS's "most wanted" for deportation list. In response
to the increasing perception that alien terrorist suspects presented intractable
problems of immigration law enforcement, Congress passed the AEDPA in
April 1996, which contained several important alien terrorist provisions."
3
These provisions were amended and strengthened just five months later when
the IIRIRA was enacted in September 1996. Together, these statutes created
special removal proceedings for aliens suspected of terrorism, including a
removal court made up of five federal district court judges.' "4 Under the
special removal procedures for suspected terrorists, the government bears a
lesser burden of proof on the issue of deportability, discovery is limited, even
prohibited in the case of classified information, judicial review is expedited,
and the customary forms of relief from removal are unavailable." 5
E. Mandatory Detention of Certain Criminal Aliens
Since 1996, many avenues of relief from detention that were once
available to criminal aliens who are subject to deportation have been
foreclosed. These forms of relief included waiver, bond and release on the
alien's own recognizance. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 provided that
aggravated felons, including lawful permanent residents, would be subject to
111. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 279 (1996).
112. Osuna, supra note 106, at 4-2.
113. Id. at 4-7.
114. Id. at 4-8.
115. Susan L. Pilcher, Justice Without a Blindfold: Criminal Proceedings and the Alien
Defendant, 50 ARK. L. REV. 269, 285-86 (1997).
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mandatory detention without bond. IIRIRA subsequently provided for the
mandatory detention of virtually all criminal aliens subject to deportation,
regardless of family ties, dependent children, or the extensiveness of the
alien's ties to his community. 16 Immigration detention is onerous for all
detainees because of the character of the facilities in which they are held.
Immigration detainees are securely confined in county jails, federal lockups
and INS detention centers under conditions that are more restrictive than
those in many state prisons.117 These restrictive conditions are particularly
harsh and inequitable for lawful permanent residents, many of whom have
resided in the U.S. for many years and have children and other family
members who are U.S. citizens.' 1
8
The mandatory detention provisions in the ADAA and the IIRIRA dramati-
cally increased the volume of detainees confined and the length of their
confinement. For example, in 1981 the average stay in an INS detention
facility was less than four days." 9 By 1990, it grew to 23 days, with many
individuals detained for more than a year, ' 20 and a year later it had more than
doubled to 54 days. 121 After the enactment of the 1996 legislation the range
of time in detention expanded greatly. By 1998 the average length of
detention had dropped to 34 days, 122 primarily reflecting the expedited
removal of large numbers of Mexican nationals at the southern border. After
1996, far greater numbers of aliens were moving through the detention
system, ranging from a mere two days to several years. The numbers reflect
not only the increasing volume of detainees, but the broader scope of
116. INA Section 236(c) provides that the Attorney General shall detain and shall not release
aliens who have been convicted of aggravated felonies, multiple crimes involving moral turpitude,
controlled substance violations, certain firearm offense, a moral turpitude crime committed within
five years of the date of admission, and crimes involving terrorism. FRAGOMEN, ET AL., supra note 12,
at 1:42.
117. While the conditions under which detainees are confined may resemble that of their criminal
counterparts, they are, in fact, far worse. Detainees have fewer due process rights than are granted to
American prisoners. Aliens have no right to court appointed counsel. This means that if a detainee
cannot afford legal services, he must go without. In fact, the Executive Office for Immigration
Review has reported that less than I1% of detainees receive attorney assistance. Donald Kerwin,
Throwing Away the Key: Lifers in INS Custody, 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES 649, 659 (1998). Detainees
are also cut off from services simply because they do not speak the language. The INS usually only
provides detainees with translators in the event of an emergency or a medical examination, and often
these are provided by phone. Wendy Young, US Detention of Women and Children Asylum Seekers: A
Violation of Human Rights, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 577, 586 (1999). The few services to
which detainees do have access are threatened by the explosion in the number of immigration
detainees. The INS is sending more aliens to detention centers that are already overcrowded and
understaffed.
118. Mandatory detention has been constitutionally challenged in the courts on a few grounds.
Several federal courts of appeals have taken the position that the mandatory detention of lawful
permanent residents without an individualized bond hearing violates due process. See Kim v. Ziglar,
276 F.3d 523, 526 (91h Cir. 2002), Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299, 311 (3d Cir. 2001).
119. ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project, Justice Detained: Conditions at the Varick Street
Immigration Detention Center (1993), p. 1 .
120. Id. Welch, supra note 14.
121. ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project, supra note 119.
122. Testimony of Doris Meissner, Commissioner of the INS before the Subcommittee on
Immigration, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 1998 WL 18089535 (Sept. 16, 1998).
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detention as well. The numbers further reflect the fact that the INS began to
detain categories of immigrants-such as lawful permanent residents, women,
children and families-it had traditionally released in the past.
F. Elimination of Judicial Review of Parole and Bond Decisions
Prior to the passage of the AEDPA, criminal aliens had a range of relief
from deportation available to them, including suspension of deportation
under Section 212(c) of the INA, adjustment of status, and political asylum-
based withholding of deportation. Section 440(d) of the AEDPA foreclosed
such relief by barring most aliens deportable on criminal grounds from
cancellation or suspension of their deportation orders. 1
23
Section 236(c) of the INA provides that a non-U.S. citizen residing in the
United States who has been convicted of an aggravated felony may not be
released on bond. This mandatory detention provision passed as part of the
IIRIRA. Once a non-citizen completes a criminal sentence, he or she is
detained by the INS for removal purposes and is entitled to a bond hearing in
front of an immigration judge. If the immigration judge determines that the
alien is detainable under section 236(c), the judge is precluded from inquir-
ing into grounds that might exist for releasing a detainee on bond.
G. The Use of Criminal Law Enforcement Methods to Enforce Civil
Orders1
24
One of the most unprecedented changes to accompany the beefing up of
immigration law enforcement has been the increasingly cooperative relation-
ship between local and state law enforcement officers and the INS. Tradition-
ally, local and state law enforcement was separate from federal enforcement
of most immigration orders. State and local law enforcement officers were
expressly authorized to enforce the criminal provisions of the federal
immigration statute-the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA)-as
early as its enactment in 1952. However, the Department of Justice has
historically taken the position that "local police should refrain from detaining
any person not suspected of a crime, solely on the ground that they may be
123.. Pub. L.No. 104-132, 100 Stat. 1214 (1996). Despite the fact that the IIRIRA re-established
the statutory eligibility of most criminal aliens by limiting section 44(d) to aggravated felons, the
change is on paper only since the term has been so greatly expanded that most felons qualify as
aggravated felons.
Prior to the passage of the AEDPA, Section 212(c) of the INA allowed the INS, in its discretion, to
waive the deportation of criminal aliens. Section 440(d) of the AEDPA barred the availability of
Section 212(c) relief to most criminal aliens. When the IIRIRA was enacted several months after the
AEDPA was passed, the latter act overturned Section 212(c), replacing it altogether with Section
240A(a). See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 309-546 at § 309 (1996).
124. See generally Lenni B. Benson, By Hook or by Crook: Exploring the Legality of an INS
Sting Operation, 31 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 813 (1994).
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[civilly] deportable."'' 25 This position was reiterated as recently as 1996 when
a formal Department of Justice memorandum concluded that "[s]tate police
lack recognized legal authority to arrest or detain aliens solely for purposes
of civil immigration proceedings as opposed to criminal prosecution."'
' 26
Until the enactment of the AEDPA and the IIRIRA in 1996, this was the
official position of the federal government regarding state authority to
enforce federal immigration orders with one very narrow exception. 2
However, with the enactment of the AEDPA and the IIRIRA in April and
September of 1996, and the emphasis in these Acts on enhancing immigra-
tion law enforcement, Congress has begun to destabilize this well-settled
principle. Among the amendments to the INA contained in these statutes are
several provisions increasing the scope of state and local law enforcement
activity in certain narrow and carefully delineated circumstances. First,
Section 439 of the AEDPA authorizes the apprehension and detention of
criminal aliens previously deported or having left the United States. It is
unclear whether state and local officers can arrest criminal aliens under this
section for the newly criminalized act of reentry by a criminal alien. Second,
the IIRIRA amended the INA to authorize the Attorney General to enter into
agreements with states and localities to allow their agents deemed qualified
to perform the investigatory, arrest and detention functions of an immigration
officer to do so with sufficient federal oversight. These provisions further
permit the INS Commissioner to enter into agreements with state and local
law enforcement agencies for the purpose of assisting in the enforcement of
immigration laws.
Even where federal immigration officers are not working with criminal
law enforcement officers, they are increasingly employing criminal law
enforcement techniques in an unprecedented manner. For example, in 1993,
the INS District Office in San Diego conducted an undercover "sting"
operation to entice deportable aliens into the office.'1 8 The office sent 600
125. Jeff Lewis, et al., Authority of State and Local Officers to Arrest Aliens Suspected of Civil
Infractions of Federal Immigration Law, 7 BENDER'S IMM. BULL. 944 (2002) (citing Local Police
Involvement in the Enforcement of Immigration Law, I Tox. HIsp. J.L. & POL'Y 9, 36 (quoting Att'y
Gen. Bell, Dep't of Justice Press Release, June 23, 1978)). The logic behind the separation of the
authority was that society was better protected if non-citizens legally and illegally residing in the U.S.
did not live in fear of police officers, sheriff's deputies and other agents of state and local law
enforcement. The established wisdom was that illegal aliens and legal aliens from mixed-status
families and communities would not report crimes or assist law enforcement officers in the
investigation of crimes if doing so would jeopardize their liberty (or that of relatives and friends).
126. Lewis, supra note 125, at 945.
127. Pursuant to an amendment of Section 103(a)(8) of the INA, only in the extraordinary event
that the U.S. Attorney General (I) determines that a mass influx of aliens presents an emergency
requiring an immediate response, and (2) expressly authorizes state or local law enforcement officers
to exercise "powers, privileges, or duties" conferred to federal agents under the INA, could state and
local officers exercise the civil arrest powers of INS officers, and then only with the consent of the
head of the state or local law enforcement agency, presumably under the close direction of the
Attorney General. In the fifty years that this provision has been in effect, this power has been invoked
only once, in 1994, during a mass migration of Cuban and Haitian refugees to Florida. Id. at 946-47.
128. Benson, supra note 124, at 813-14.
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letters to aliens extending a "one-time" offer of amnesty and employment
authorization pursuant to a purported "new law" recently passed. There was
no such law.12 9 However many deportable aliens were apprehended and
detained pending deportation. 30 The INS had previously conducted under-
cover operations to apprehend aliens involved in serious criminal activities
such as buying and selling illegal documents, bribing INS officials and alien
smuggling. Nevertheless, the San Diego operation markedly departed from
standard INS procedures by using a sting operation to enforce civil deporta-
tion orders.' 3' Another example of the INS adopting law enforcement
techniques is the relatively recent arming of INS officers. The Immigration
Act of 1990 authorized INS officers to carry firearms, execute warrants and
make arrests. 1
32
IV. GREATER CRIMINAL CONSEQUENCES FOR IMMIGRATION VIOLATIONS,
MANY OF WHICH WERE PREVIOUSLY TREATED CIVILLY
The second most significant aspect of the criminalization of immigration
law-in addition to treating non-citizens with greater criminal punitiveness
within a regulatory framework that was formally "civil" in nature-has been
the increased prosecution of immigration violations as federal crimes. Since
the mid-1980's, non-citizens have been increasingly brought into the formal
criminal justice system by virtue of being prosecuted for federal crimes that
were once treated as civil violations or were never previously defined as
crimes. Once a non-citizen is convicted under these new categories of crimes,
that conviction virtually ensures an alien's deportation. In this sense, in-
creased federal prosecution of immigration violations feeds the criminal
alien "pipeline."
In the past two decades, criminal prosecutions of immigration violations
have increased rapidly. Between 1984 and 1994, the number of individuals
prosecuted in the federal courts for immigration felonies and Class A
misdemeanors rose from 1,186 to 3,477. 133 In addition, about 7,000 individu-
als are prosecuted annually for B and C misdemeanor immigration viola-
tions. 134
The expansion of categories of federal crimes subjecting non-citizens to
formal criminal punishment fall into two main categories: (1) the criminaliza-
tion of immigration violations that were previously civil violations; and (2)
enhanced criminal penalties for existing immigration-related crimes. The
significance of criminalizing civil violations is that the criminal prosecution
129. Id.
130. Although "the INS admitted that two of the people apprehended in the sting were later
released because they had actually become lawful permanent residents." Id. at 814, n.3.
131. Id. at814-15.
132. Pub. L. No. 10 1-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990).
133. Morris, supra note 18, at 1318.
134. Id.
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subjects a non-citizen to incarceration within the criminal justice system who
would have only been subject to deportation (for the civil violation) previ-
ously.
A. Criminalization of Immigration Violations That Were Previously Civil
in Nature
Many immigration-related activities have been newly criminalized in the
past two decades. For example, since the Marriage Fraud Act of 1986 was
passed, knowingly entering into a marriage to evade the immigration laws
has been a felony, whereas previously it was a civil violation subjecting the
alien to deportation only, not incarceration.
The IIRIRA criminalized many of the immigration-related activities to
which civil penalties previously applied. The IIRIRA created new federal
offenses for a range of activities including: voting in a federal election as a
non-citizen; 135 knowingly making a false claim to citizenship to obtain a
benefit or employment in the U.S. as a non-citizen;136 failing to disclose, or
concealing, one's role in the preparation of false documents to obtain
immigration benefits; 137 and fleeing from an immigration checkpoint "in
excess of the speed limit" regardless of your citizenship status. 138
B. Enhanced Criminal Penalties for Existing Immigration-Related Crimes
Although entering the U.S. without documentation has been a crime since
1952, it was prosecuted as a misdemeanor unless the alien entering without
documentation had been previously excluded or deported. 139 If she had been
previously excluded or deported, she could be charged with a felony. The
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 increased the criminal penalty for illegal
reentry after deportation or exclusion from up to two years to a maximum of
five or ten years, depending upon whether the alien was previously deported
for an aggravated felony or not. 4o
Prior to the 1980's, wide scale detention of aliens by the INS was highly
unusual. The conventional policy for dealing with undocumented aliens
135. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 216, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). Ameliorative legislation enacted in 2000 clarified that
criminal penalties would not be imposed under sections 215 or 216 if the parents of the voter are
citizens, the voter permanently resided in the US prior to reaching age 16, or the voter reasonably
believed that he of she was a US citizen at the time. See Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-395, 114 Stat. 1631 (2000).
136. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 215.
137. Id. at § 213.
138. Id. at § 108.
139. Id. at § 324 (amending § 276(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationalization Act), codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1). See FRAGOMEN, supra note 12, at 1-10.
140. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7345, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988). In 1994, Section 13002 of the Violent
Crime Control Act and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 increased the penalty to a maximum of 10 or 20
years. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified at 8 USC § 1326 (1994).
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coming into the United States was exclusion at the border or deportation of
those who had already crossed the border illegally, with liberal provision for
bond, release on one's own recognizance, and other forms of parole. 4 ' Those
excludable aliens eligible for parole included detainees with serious medical
conditions, pregnant women, juveniles, detainees on whose behalf relatives
had filed a visa petition, witnesses in governmental proceedings and "aliens
whose continued detention is not in the public interest."' 14 2 Of the undocu-
mented, asylum seekers in particular were generally afforded relief from
detention due to a broad recognition that their undocumented entry stemmed
from duress-fear of persecution at the hands of their home government and
poor prospects for government approval to leave the country and widespread
domestic and international criticism of the incarceration of asylum seek-
ers. 143 Aliens who were legally residing in the United States, but committed
acts subjecting them to deportation, likewise had options other than deten-
tion. Yet today, immigration detainees represent the fastest growing segment
of the jail population in the United States. '4 The INS contracts out to local
and municipal jails the care, custody and control of approximately 60% of all
its detainees.' 45 A total of 5,532 detainees were held in INS custody in
1994.146 In 1997, as the rapid increase in the number of federal and states
inmates actually slowed - to 5.2% from a decade-long average of 7% growth
- the number of detainees in INS custody rose to 16,000, representing a
tripling over a period of four years. 147 In fiscal year 2000 alone, INS admitted
more than a total of 188,000 aliens into detention. 48 In fiscal year 2001, the
average daily detention population rose to approximately 20,000. 149
141. Although the law was apparently clear on its face that "every alien" seeking entry whose
entitlement to enter was not established "clearly and beyond a doubt" to an examining immigration
officer "shall be detained for further inquiry," in reality the discretionary authority of the Attorney
General to parole, rather than deport, any applicant for admission for reason of emergency or public
interest allowed for liberal provision of parole. INA § 235(b); INA § 212(d)(5); Margaret H. Taylor,
Detention and Related Issues, in JUAN OSUNA, UNDERSTANDING THE 1996 IMMIGRATION ACT 5-2 (1st
ed. 1997).
142. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b) (2003).
143. Taylor, supra note 141, at 5-2.
144. Non-U.S. citizens also represent a growing segment of the United States prison population,
as more aliens are being prosecuted-and receiving longer sentences-for violating federal immigra-
tion laws.
145. William G. Paul, America's Harsh and Unjust Immigration Laws, USA TODAY MAG., July 1,
2000, available at http://www.findarticles.com/cfo/m/272/2662-129/636681 Il/.
146. Review of Department of Justice Immigration Detention Policies: Hearing Before the House
Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (2001) (statement
of Joseph R. Greene, Acting Deputy Executive Associate Commissioner for Field Operations,
Immigration and Naturalization Service).
147. Mike Clary and Patrick McDonnell, Sentenced to a Life in Limbo, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1998,
at A 1; Cheryl Little, INS Detention in Florida, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 551 (1999).
148. Review of Department of Justice Immigration Detention Policies, Hearing Before the House
Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement
of Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee).
149. Id.
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In the custody of the INS, these detainees are little more than prisoners.
Detainees who may have done nothing more serious than come to the United
States without documentation seeking asylum or who overstay their visas are
housed with maximum-security criminal offenders in federal prisons and
local county jails. Detainees are required to wear prison uniforms. They are
transported in handcuffs and shackles, and disciplined harshly, even though
their failure to conform to prison rules may result not from belligerence, but
poor English comprehension and cultural differences.
C. Reforms in Immigration Law After September l1th Continued the
Enhanced Law Enforcement Agenda
The horrific events that took place on September 11, 2001 recast the entire
debate on immigration law enforcement. Prior to 9/11, the harsh detention
and removal of criminal aliens brought about by the 1996 immigration
reforms was roundly criticized for taking a "bright line" approach to solving
the country's immigration problems by imposing disproportionately harsh-
and in some cases, retroactive-penalties, and by inordinately relying upon
detention and removal. 150 The New York Times ran a series of stories
chronicling the harsh treatment and disproportionate punishment visited
upon immigrants with minor criminal convictions in their pasts and long,
established ties to the U.S.151 In addition to heavily relying upon detention
and removal, the 1996 immigration reforms have been criticized for eliminat-
ing flexibility, reducing the potential for illegal immigration and leading to
"outcomes that, while technically justified, simply do not fit the common
sense of justice that most Americans have."' 52 Although the 1996 reforms
included tools with which the U.S. government could combat terrorism,
1 53
their immediate impact was on the social welfare of classes of immigrants
long considered problematic: illegal aliens, criminal aliens, refugees, welfare
dependent immigrants, etc. Not until the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and
the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 was terrorism widely
perceived as a national crisis. From that point on, the tools Congress created
to enhance immigration law enforcement would be aggressively deployed in
the war on terror. In the weeks and months following the attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon, the sympathetic stories of immigrants facing
deportation and detention were completely overshadowed by the goal of
150. Bach, supra note 9, at 10.
151. Lena Williams, A Law Aimed at Terrorists Hits Legal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1996
at A 1; Celia W. Dugger, After Crime, She Made a New Life, but Now Faces Deportation, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. I1, 1997 at AI; Deborah Sontag, U.S. Deports Felons but Can't Keep Them Out, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. II, 1997 at Al.
152. Robert Bach, supra note 9, at 11. Mirta Ojito, Change in Laws Sets Off Big Wave of
Deportations, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1998 at Al.
153. Indeed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996), was symbolically enacted one year after the bombing of the federal building in
Oklahoma City and designed to combat domestic and international terrorism.
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avenging the attacks and preventing further terrorist strikes against the U.S.
One has only to recall the preventive detention of over a thousand Muslims
and men of Arab descent to understand the degree of human suffering the
government was willing to tolerate in order to bring down the persons
responsible for the attacks. At the time, few officials were willing to risk
immigration policies aimed at less than total control.1 54 An expeditious
means to achieving total control was enhanced law enforcement.
The immigration reforms of the 1980's and 1990's paved the way for a greatly
enhanced anti-terror-based law enforcement agenda after September l1th. The
single most prominent law enforcement tool in the 1990's-detention-
immediately rose to the forefront of the war on terror. The authority of immigration
officials to detain non-citizens greatly facilitated the mass detention of Muslim and
Arab aliens. Indeed although the investigation into the attacks constituted a search
for criminal suspects, the immigration law enforcement system was the primary
legal regime under which the investigation was conducted. This is due to the
broader discretion immigration officials enjoy to arrest, detain and deport non-
citizens with less judicial oversight and fewer substantive rights accruing to the
arrest, detainee or deportee. Although this authority has traditionally been broad,
the reforms of 1996 broadened this authority even further, and reduced judicial
oversight even more. After the attacks, the Department of Justice initially under-
took to protect national security by preventively detaining hundreds of foreign
potential terrorist sympathizers. Later, it would focus more narrowly on detaining
and prosecuting (or removing) both alien and citizen suspected terrorists.
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 have had a profound
impact on the direction of federal immigration law. They derailed an
embryonic softening in political attitudes toward illegal immigration and
highlighted the ease with which immigration law could once again be
flouted and manipulated for malevolent purposes. Recall the much-
publicized meeting between President Bush and Mexican President
Vicente Fox regarding liberalization of U.S. policies toward Mexican
immigration that took place just prior to the terrorist attacks of September
11 th. On the table were a host of immigration reforms including a plan to
allow some of the estimated 3.5 million Mexicans living in the U.S.
illegally to earn permanent residency. 155 The possibility of sweeping
154. Indeed, the Inspector General issued a report criticizing Attorney General John Ashcroft's
strategy of presuming all Muslim and Arab immigrants are guilty (of terrorism) until proven innocent.
This strategy led to the apprehension, detention and mistreatment of hundreds of Muslim and Arab
immigrants immediately following 9/11. See Eric Lichtblau, Ashcroft Defends Detentions as
Immigrants Recount Toll, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2003, at A23 ("Many of the suspects were left in jail
cells for weeks or months without being formally charged, with some suffering physical and verbal
abuse from their jailers, investigators found, and few of the detainees proved to have ties to terrorists,
investigators found.").
155. Ginger Thompson, Mexico President Urges U.S. to Act Soon on Migrants, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
6, 2001, at Al; David E. Sanger, Mexico's President Rewrites the Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2001, at
At.
2003]
GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL
immigration reforms favoring undocumented Mexican workers reflected
less of a break with the immigration law enforcement agenda set on the
mid-1980's and more of a cleavage in the conservative political climate
dead set against increased legal and illegal immigration based upon
Bush's desire to woo Hispanic voters, many of whom contributed to his
presidential victory. Congress was moving forward with Mexican immi-
gration reforms that were expected to pass in the House of Representa-
tives on September II, 2001. The attacks derailed these initiatives and set
in motion a series of new reforms that would reinforce, and ultimately
dwarf, the law enforcement imperative in immigration law that gained
momentum in the late 1980's that culminated in harsh AEDPA and
IIRAIRA legislation in 1996. Furthermore, the attacks highlighted the
danger presented not just by illegal immigrants but by legal immigrants to
national security, as well as the country's vulnerability to the criminal
terrorist activities of non-citizens. In the wake of the September l1th
attacks, the executive and legislative branches of government made
sweeping legal reforms that, inter alia, expanded the INS' detention
power, provided law enforcement with new funding and powers to search,
surveil and detain suspected terrorists, and ushered in an era of unprec-
edented cooperation between immigration, state and federal law enforce-
ment. Ultimately, in the name of fostering this cooperation, the INS
would be dismantled and absorbed into the Department of Homeland
Security.
Immediately after September 1 Ith, the government relied heavily upon the
combined power and discretion of immigrations officials and criminal
prosecutors to preventively detain nearly 1200 men of Arab descent in an
effort to paralyze further acts of terror by potential terrorist sympathizers.
With no express legal authority to preventively detain for acts of terrorism,
the government utilized the near complete discretion of the INS to hold
non-citizens on suspicion of immigration violations.' 56 Attorney General
John Ashcroft revised the INS' detention rules to expand the government's
power to detain aliens. Whereas previously the INS had only 24 hours to
either release detained immigrants or charge them with a crime or with
violating the terms of their visa, under its new powers, the agency would
have 48 hours to decide whether to release or charge a detained alien.
However, if the agency could claim emergency or extraordinary circum-
stances, the 48-hour deadline was waived and the alien held for an additional
"reasonable period of time" without charges. In addition to enhanced INS
authority, the government further relied upon the broad authority of federal
prosecutors over persons defined as "material witnesses" to detain potential
156. William Glaberson, After the Attacks: Legal Constraints; Investigators Explore Boundaries




Among the provisions of the Act strengthening cooperation between
immigration and other law enforcement agencies, Section 403 gives the INS
access to the files of the National Crime Information Center for the purpose
of verifying the criminal histories of immigrant and non-immigrant aliens. It
further mandates the development of technology that will operate across law
enforcement agencies and across electronic platforms to ensure that there
will be a cost-effective, efficient and fully-integrated means to share law
enforcement and intelligence information for the verification of criminal
histories.
V. THE NEW PENOLOGY AT WORK IN THE REGULATION OF NON-CITIZENS
Over a decade ago, Feeley and Simon first discerned a new strategic
formation within the field of criminal sanctions and correctional supervision.
They called it the "new penology." They identified three areas of transforma-
tion in penal processes that characterize the new penology: the emergence of
new discourses; the formation of new objectives; and new techniques. 158
Simon expanded these initial theoretical insights into a broader theory of the
role crime increasingly plays in self-government, or in the exercise of power
over others in a variety of contexts, such as family, work, schools, businesses
and professional organizations. He labeled this phenomenon "governing
through crime," and went on to explain how it fits within a larger crisis of
social liberal governmentality that began in the 1970's when social liberal
("New Deal") strategies of managing social change were rejected by conser-
vative leaders, such as Reagan and Thatcher, seeking new processes of rule
and governance. 159
This section examines aspects of Simon's and other's theories about the
transformation of penal processes and explains how the new penology is at
work within recent reforms in the legal regulation of non-U.S. citizens. After
discussing the new penology within harsh reforms aimed at removing
criminal aliens from the country, I will go on to describe how the War on
Terrorism and its powerful new objective of protecting national security has
continued and accelerated the governance of non-citizens through crime,
157. Id. Under federal law, a person can be held as a material witness if there is probable cause to
believe the person has information that could be important to an investigation and it may be difficult
to assure that the person will be available to testify. Material witness warrants lend themselves to this
particular application because of the lighter burden of demonstrating that a person has information
than demonstrating reasonable suspicion that he or she is involved in a terrorist conspiracy.
Additionally, the international nature of the Al Qaeda terrorist network made it easy for prosecutors to
demonstrate risk of flight.
158. Jonathan Simon, The Ideological Effects ofActuarial Practices, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 771
(1988); Malcolm Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of
Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 4 (1992).
159. Jonathan Simon, Sanctioning Government: Explaining America's Severity Revolution, 56 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 217 (2001).
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while simultaneously diverging from the objectives and discourses that
characterize the new penology.
Any discussion of how the new penology functions within recent immigra-
tion policy reforms must draw upon the theoretical insights in an earlier work
by Jonathan Simon on the significance of immigration imprisonment as an
aspect of the broader transformation of penality in the United States.
Refugees in a Carceral Age: The Rebirth of Immigration Prisons in the
United StateS160 is the rare article that links the resurgent practice of
imprisoning criminal aliens and refugees to mass incarceration within the
penal system. Feeley situates the renewed practice of systematically impris-
oning immigrants within emerging strategies for governing "global cities"
and the continuing digression of penal practices from the progressive spirit of
modernity.
Simon's observations provide a frame of reference, as well as points of
contrast, for the analysis in this paper of recent immigration reforms taking
more punitive approaches to criminal aliens, refugees and most recently,
communities identified with terrorism. First, Simon observes that the promo-
tion of Haitian refugees as a "dangerous class" harkens back to monarchical
practices of maintaining social order that are distinctly anti-democratic.
Consistent with this notion, I suggest that "criminal aliens" have likewise
been constructed as a dangerous class, similar to the Nineteenth Century
application of criminal stereotypes to Southern and Eastern European ethnic
groups to justify their imprisonment.161 Furthermore, I contend that the war
on terrorism has constructed a new "dangerous class" consisting of Muslims,
Arab nationals and Arab Americans. 1
62
Second, Simon observes that immigration detention is, in part, a response
to a crisis in urban social order; that it governs target populations of
"dangerous" non-U.S. citizens in the context of a globalized economy
destabilized by transnational flows of capital and labor.163 Simon's analysis
focuses on the detention of refugees in Miami, an important site of transna-
tional impact and urban crisis, as a technology of governance in a globalized
160. Jonathan Simon, Refugees in a Carceral Age: The Rebirth of Immigration Prisons in the
United States, 10 PUBLIC CULTURE 3, 577-606 (1998).
161. Id. at 601. For sociological literature documenting the persistence of the stereotype of the
criminal immigrant, see generally Ramiro Martinez and Matthew Lee, On Immigration and Crime, in
THE NATURE OF CRIME: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, I CRIM. JUST. 485-524 (Gary LaFree ed., 2000);
Tony Waters, CRIME AND IMMIGRANT YOUTH (1999); and Franco Ferracuti, European Migration and
Crime, in CRIME AND CULTURE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF THORSTEN SELLIN 189-219 (Marvin Wolfgang et
al. eds., 1968).
162. In contrast to criminal aliens, whose perceived "dangerousness" harkens back to widespread
anxiety about (and fear of) the perceived criminality of an earlier group of immigrants (Nineteenth
Century Southern European immigrants), this newest "dangerous class" ignores distinctions of
citizenship. Arab nationals, Muslims and Arab Americans (sometimes referred to as "American born"
Arabs) alike are suspected of possible links to terrorism and for their "foreignness." In contrast to the
perceived dangerousness of criminal aliens, this construction of dangerousness blurs the boundary
between citizens and immigrants.
163. Simon, supra note 160, at 603.
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economy prior to the declaration of war on terrorism. In contrast, my analysis
of immigration reforms treating illegal aliens, refugees, criminal aliens and
terror-suspect communities more punitively is not limited to detention or to a
particular city. I contend that these punitive reforms have displaced social
liberal governing strategies that were in crisis with a governing strategy that
weeds out certain undesirable non-citizens (and increasingly, citizens) through
surveillance, fear, commodification and incarceration.
A. Governing through Crime
To the extent that a crime fighting agenda has redefined the priorities of the
immigration system in the past twenty years, immigration law is "governing
through crime." Within the broad reconfiguration of immigration policies
around crime control, several themes stand out: (1) the enormous growth of
the infrastructure of immigration law enforcement; (2) the growing percent-
age of non-citizens under penal supervision; (3) the prioritization of criminally-
constituted subjects as targets for immigration law enforcement; and (4) the
simultaneous growth in the numbers of non-citizens admitted to and deported
from the United States.
1. Growth of the infrastructure of immigration law enforcement
The immigration system has grown dramatically in the past twenty years.
At a time in which Congress was slashing federal spending, the INS grew
rapidly as Congress appropriated larger and larger sums to apprehending,
imprisoning and removing illegal aliens and aliens with past criminal
convictions.' 64Between 1993 and 2001, the INS budget grew more than 230
percent-from $1.5 billion to $5.0 billion. 165 Most of the growth occurred in
law enforcement. From 1990 to 2001, spending for enforcement programs
grew from $933 million to $3.1 billion, nearly five times as much as spending
for naturalization and other immigrant services. 166 Staffing for law enforce-
ment activities-border control in particular-likewise grew dramatically,
more than doubling in this same peiod of time from 11,418 to 23,364.167 The
INS designated a substantial amount of its increased funding for expanding
its detention capacity twofold, and likewise doubling the number of employ-
164. ANDREAS, supra note 72, at 89-91 (describing the aggressive and unprecedented expansion
of the INS under the Clinton administration, emphasizing the fact that the build up ran counter to the
political devolution-limitations on federal spending and greater decision-making power at the state
level-that was popular at the time).
165. MICHAEL WELCH, DETAINED: IMMIGRATION LAWS AND THE EXPANDING INS JAIL COMPLEX 47
(2002).
166. Id. Welch points out that law enforcement dominated increases in INS full-time, permanent
staffing. Whereas the total number of INS employees increased by 79 percent between 1993 and
2001, most of the growth occurred in enforcement programs, such as Border Patrol where staffing
increased 159%, and the detention and deportation sector. Id.
167. Id.
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ees involved in confining and deporting non-citizens. 168 In 1998, with a
billion dollar budget for the detention and deportation of immigrants and
over 15,000 officers authorized to carry weapons and make arrests (more
than the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Prisons, the Customs
Service or the Drug Enforcement Administration) the INS became the largest
federal law enforcement agency.1
6 9
Since the terrorist attacks of September 1 1th, the growth in government
spending on screening non-citizens for connections to terrorism has been
profound. New appropriations fund a variety of costly, technologically
sophisticated programs, such as the National Security Entry Exit Registration
System (NSEERS), that require men 16 years and older who are citizens of
some 25 countries (all predominantly Muslim countries with the exception of
one) to be fingerprinted and photographed by the INS;' 70 SEVIS (the foreign
student tracking system to verify compliance with student visas); 17 ' and IBIS
(the Interagency Border Inspection System) that has automated screening of
non-citizens at U.S. ports-of-entry by making available to INS and customs
officers in the field an integrated database of known and suspected terrorists
in the United States. 1
72
2. The growing percentage of non-citizens under penal supervision
As the immigration system has shifted away from bond and parole by
mandating imprisonment for illegal and criminal aliens, more and more
non-U.S. citizens are being confined in jails and federal prisons across the
country. Currently, immigration detainees represent the fastest growing
segment of the jail population in the United States. ' 73
168. Id.
169. Ojito, supra note 152.
170. In February 2003, Congress allocated $362 million to fund the first year of the program's
operation in an omnibus appropriations bill. George Lardner, Jr., Congress Funds INS Registration
System But Demands Details, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2003, at A 18.
171. Designed to replace the INS' paper-based system for tracking and monitoring nearly I
million foreign students, the internet-based computer system which over 3000 schools are mandated
by Congress to use to cost $37 million. Marcia Slacum Greene, Computer Problems Slow Tracking of
Foreign Students, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2003, at A6.
172. These programs were all mandated by the USA PATRIOT Act (Pub. L. No, 107-56) which
became effective on October 26, 2001, and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, which became effective on May 14, 2002.
173. In the custody of the INS, these detainees are little more than prisoners. Detainees who may
have done nothing more serious than come to the United States without documentation seeking
asylum or who overstay their visas are housed with maximum-security criminal offenders in federal
prisons and local county jails. Detainees are required to wear prison uniforms. They are transported in
handcuffs and shackles, and disciplined harshly, even though their failure to conform to prison rules
may result not from belligerence, but poor English comprehension and cultural ignorance.
While the conditions under which detainees are confined may resemble that of their criminal
counterparts, they are, in fact, far worse. Detainees have fewer due process rights than are granted to
American prisoners. Aliens have no right to court-appointed counsel. This means that if a detainee
cannot afford legal services, he must go without. In fact, the Executive Office for Immigration
Review has reported that less than 11% of detainees receive attorney assistance. Kerwin, supra note
117. Detainees are also cut off from services simply because they do not speak the language. INS
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The immigration system contracts out to local and municipal jails the care,
custody and control of approximately 60% of all its detainees, 174 and spends
more than a third of its $900 million detention budget on renting cells - most
of which are in remote, rural county jails - where the costs are low and the
availability of beds is high. Fifty-five hundred detainees were held in INS
custody in 1994. In 1997, as the rapid increase in the number of federal and
state inmates actually slowed - to 5.2% from a decade-long average of 7%
growth - the number of detainees in INS custody rose to 16,000, representing
a tripling over a period of five years. 175 In 2001, the daily detention
population of INS detainees was 22,000, contributing to an annual total of
about 200,000 aliens passing through INS custody in 2001.
3. Prioritization of criminally-constituted subjects as targets for
immigration law enforcement
The immigration system governs through crime when it targets certain
criminally constituted subjects for confinement and expulsion. I use the term
"criminally constituted" intentionally. Many of the individuals targeted for
detention and deportation have tenuous connections to crime that are given
greater weight as crime becomes a mode of governing immigrants. These
subjects include asylum seekers who falsify their immigration documents; 176
workers who cross the border without authorization; former felons or even
misdemeanants; and more recently visa overstayers177 and men of Arab
descent---even U.S. citizens-who are criminally suspicious only because
they share the same ethnicity as the notorious 9/11 hijackers. These subjects
have all been made the targets of increased law enforcement activity as a
result of changing modes of govemmentality. Illegal immigrants, perceived
more sympathetically in the 1960's and 1970's as poor people making
reasonably appropriate decisions to assure their families' welfare, were
usually only provides detainees with translators in the event of an emergency or a medical
examination, and often these are provided by phone. Wendy Young, U.S. Detention of Women and
Children Asylum Seekers: A Violation of Human Rights, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 577, 586
(1999). The few services detainees do have access to are threatened by the explosion in the number of
INS detainees. INS is sending more aliens to detention centers that are already overcrowded and
understaffed.
174. William G. Paul, America's Harsh and Unjust Immigration Laws, USA TODAY MAG., July 1,
2000, available at http://www.findarticles.com/cf o/m/272/2662-129/636681 11/.
175. Mike Clary & Patrick McDonnell, Sentenced to a Life in Limbo, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1998,
at Al; Cheryl Little, INS Detention in Florida, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 551 (1999).
176. See Mailman, supra note 24, at 763 (noting that federal prosecutors in South Florida have
criminally charged dozens of recently arrived asylum seekers for entering the US with false
documents).
177. Although cracking down on visa overstayers has been a prominent post-9/lI theme, visa
overstayers were the subject of bureaucratic crisis as early as 1979 when President Carter attempted
to expel Iranian students living in the United States that had overstayed their visas. Then, as after
9/11, the inability of the immigration system to track or even identify nonresident aliens who
overstayed their visas caused alarm, and gave rise to calls for reform. MORRIS, supra note 8, at
112-113.
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ultimately victims of the cultural backlash that occurred when the social
liberal mode of governmentality was de-legitimated. Criminal aliens, includ-
ing many lawful permanent residents who have resided in the United States
since childhood and whose criminal convictions are far in the past, are
likewise victims of a change in governmentality that increasingly relies upon
the benefits of criminal severity. "8 Finally, the criminal stereotyping, preven-
tive detention and special registration of alien men who are Muslim or of
Arab descent can be seen as a response to the overwhelming perception of
government incompetence in failing to detect and diffuse the terrorist plot for
massive destruction on September I Ith and then subsequently reissuing visas
for several of the dead hijackers only a few months later.'7 9
4. Simultaneous growth in the numbers of non-citizens admitted to and
deported from the United States
One of the great ironies of the current system of immigration regulation is
that the government is admitting record numbers of non-citizens into the
country at the same time it is deporting them in record numbers, 180 largely
based upon their attributed criminal status. This suggests that immigration
law governs through crime in a way that relies upon, rather than seeks to
eliminate, illegal immigration and the criminal alien population.
This reliance upon illegal immigration and criminal aliens contrasts
sharply with the role of the immigration system as it was understood for
many years prior to the reforms of the 1980's and 1990's. A centuries-old
paradigm of immigration understood the role of the immigration system as
excluding undesirable foreigners seeking to enter the United States at the
border, and admitting only those foreigners (excepting those admitted on
non-immigrant visas) whose professional skills, business opportunities, fam-
ily ties, wealth, etc., made them desirable. Desirable immigrants would be
provided immigration services and support to live, work and eventually
assimilate into the vast American middle-class, while less desirable immi-
grants would be denied admission and turned away at the border.
However, this model did not anticipate a large, persistent population of
illegal aliens. Since the demise of the social liberal state in the early 1980's, a
very different understanding of the goals of the immigration system has
178. Jonathan Simon, Sanctioning Government: Explaining America ' Severity Revolution, 56 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 217 (2001) (explaining the severity revolution as a mode of governance).
179. Dan Eggen & Mary Beth Sheridan, Terrorist Pilots'Student Visas Arrive; Officials Blame
'Antiquated'System for Delay of Paperwork, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2002, at Al.
180. Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About
Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889, 1891-92 (2000) ("The United States
presents the rather paradoxical picture of a nation-state that has expanded both the number of people
whom it admits and the number of people whom it expels. The concern, it seems, is not so much with
the quantity of immigrants as with the personal qualities. Deportation policy, in particular, has aimed




emerged. Among other signs, Proposition 187 clearly signaled American
disillusion with providing social services to all immigrants present within the
United States. The desire to retract social support for a disfavored class of
immigrants (illegal immigrants) also demonstrated a skepticism that these
immigrants would ever assimilate or make a positive contribution to the
economy or culture of the United States. This new (post-) social welfare
policy toward illegal (and ultimately all undesirable immigrants) has re-
formed the role of the immigration system drastically.
The immigration system largely abandoned the goal of eliminating illegal
immigration and focused instead on purging troublesome immigrants on the
back end of the immigration process (e.g., when an illegal alien is discovered
at a sobriety checkpoint, or a "criminal" alien is released from correctional
custody), while leaving the majority of undocumented aliens to eke out an
existence in an environment that exploits their labor and their vulnerability to
detention while still allowing them to provide cheap services to middle-class
consumers. 181
5. From individualized to group-based assessments of dangerousness
Changes in the determination of bond and parole for criminal aliens
ordered deported furnishes a clear example of the shift away from individual-
ized assessment to group-based assessments of dangerousness. Prior to 1988,
when the category of aggravated felon was created, criminal aliens ordered
deported were liberally granted bond, unless they were determined to
threaten national security, be likely to abscond or pose high bail risks.182 In
order to determine the appropriateness of bail, the immigration judge
examined the following criteria: local family ties; prior arrests, convictions,
and appearances at hearings; employment or unemployment; membership in
community organizations; manner of entry and length of time in the U.S.;
immoral acts or participation in subversive activities; and financial ability to
post bond.183 These factors assisted immigration judges in assessing the risk
individual criminal aliens presented to the community.
The advent of mandatory detention for all criminal aliens classified as
"aggravated felons" eliminated the consideration of individual equities in
bond determinations.184 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 established a
presumption against release on bond for aggravated felons, a group that
has subsequently been so broadly redefined as to encompass most
non-citizens with past felony (or in some cases misdemeanor) convic-
181. Eve Epstein, The Cost of Easy Living, Bos. GLOBE, MAY 1I, 1997, at E5. However, since
9/11, there has been a significant return to more classical, conservative notions of immigration at
evidenced by heavy reliance by judges in recent national security-related immigration cases on the
doctrine of the conservative, foundational immigration cases of the 1800's.
182. IRA KURZBAN, KURZBAN'S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 49, at 218 (8th ed. 2002).
183. Matter of Patel, 15 I&N Dec. 666 (BIA 1976).
184. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2); INA § 236(c).
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tions. AEDPA went one step further when it eliminated any relief from
detention for criminal aliens who committed aggravated felonies, drug
crimes, firearm offenses, miscellaneous crimes, or two crimes of moral
turpitude where the potential sentence equaled or exceeded one year.'
8 5
Therefore, after 1996, the consideration of individual equities in bond
determinations for most criminal aliens was abandoned, in favor of
aggregate assessments of risk based upon the categorization of an alien as
an "aggravated felon."
6. Language that classifies dangerous subpopulations
Although the actuarial language is not as prominent in the new discourse
of immigration as in crime, increasingly immigration terminology imports
crime lingo that reconfigures non-citizens as criminals. Two examples stand
out. The first is the prominence of the label "criminal alien." The second is
the expansive use of the term "aggravated felon".
(a) Criminal aliens
The term "criminal alien" has achieved great prominence in the increas-
ingly crime-defined system of immigration regulation. Yet just over twenty-
five years ago, the term was not common. For example, in the 1973 edition of
Wasserman's treatise on U.S. immigration law, the subject heading for
non-citizens deportable by reason of a criminal conviction is "convicted
aliens." 18 6 Similarly the subject heading "convicted aliens" precedes the
section on non-citizens inadmissible by reason of a criminal conviction. In
neither section is the term "criminal alien" used. The reference to the
"conviction" rather than the "criminality" of the alien is significant. The term
"criminal alien" is more pejorative. It implies that the subject has an enduring
criminal nature. In contrast, the term "convicted alien" emphasizes the past
nature of the criminal conviction, and more accurately reflects the legal status
of the subject.
By emphasizing the criminality of the subject, the deportation, inadmis-
sion or other harsh treatment of the subject is justified by the continuing
nature of the threat presented by the "criminal alien." In contrast to the
convicted alien whose riskiness is presumed to have been extinguished or at
least treated by incarceration, probation or some other form of criminal
justice supervision, the term criminal alien redefined the same subject as
inherently criminal, and therefore presenting an ongoing risk to public safety
that requires some intervention by law enforcement.
185. 8U.S.C.§ 1182(2003).
186. See generally JACK WASSERMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW & PRACTICE (2d ed. 1973).
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The term "criminal alien" is often used as if it denoted a current criminal
threat. 187 Law enforcement is justified on that basis, rather than on the ground
that they are non-citizens who are undesirable due to their criminal past and
therefore, deportable.
(b) Aggravated felons
Aggravated felons are a subgroup of aliens with criminal convictions in
their past. They have been convicted of crimes that are classified as
"aggravated felonies." The term "aggravated felony" did not exist before
1988, when the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 created a new category of
crimes for which criminal aliens could be deported. Initially, the term
referred to non-citizens who had convictions for serious crimes including
murder, drug trafficking and firearms trafficking. In addition, aggravated
felons were deprived of forms of relief from deportation that other criminal
aliens could seek based upon individual, extenuating circumstances. How-
ever, in subsequent legislation, the term "aggravated felon" was repeatedly
expanded to include more and more minor crimes, and since 1996, the
category of aggravated felony has been applied retroactively to crimes, many
of which do not subject non-citizens to deportation at the time of conviction.
The term "aggravated felon" illustrates how immigration law has adopted
a new, exaggerated classification of non-citizens with convictions in their
past that is rooted in the conceptions of group dangerousness. Ironically, the
term is now more of a creature of immigration law than of criminal law. Once
reconfigured as dangerous in excess even of the meaning of "aggravation" in
the criminal law sense, more punitive treatment is justified.
B. New Objectives
A discourse that focuses on categories and sub-populations rather than
individuals also serves different objectives than one based on moral or
187. The enduring nature of the criminal alien's dangerousness is evident in something as
mundane as the language employed in a few scant lines of prose on the website for the police
department of Dalton, Georgia. Dalton Police Department Website, at http://police.citydalton.netl
insTaskForce.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2003). The webpage describes a joint task force venture
between the City of Dalton ("the carpet capital [sic] of the world" according to the logo on the page)
and the local INS office. The site describes the main purpose of the task force as "the investigation
and prosecution of criminal aliens in the Dalton area." After assuring the reader that the identities of
those reporting illegal aliens and criminal aliens will be held in confidence, the description of the task
force ends with the assurance that "the Criminal Alien Task Force appreciates your assistance in the
fight against crime involving aliens." From this language, one gets no sense of the non-citizen with a
criminal conviction in her past, but instead gets a very keen sense of the criminal alien as an ongoing
threat to the safety of the community in Dalton, Georgia. The website also fails to distinguish illegal
aliens from criminal aliens, thus implying that all are subject to deportation when, in fact, only some
criminal aliens are deportable. So, in effect, the term "criminal alien" categorizes a broad population
as a present law enforcement risk despite the fact that (I) a past conviction does not predict present
dangerousness, and (2) that some aliens with past convictions (mostly misdemeanants) are not subject
to deportation by the INS, much less criminally-assisted civil law enforcement by local police.
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clinical judgments about individuals. Feeley and Simon observed that the
new penology evidences a shift away from the goal of normalizing criminal
offenders toward the goal of managing them. Replacing the goal of treatment
or rehabilitation of the criminally deviant, is the new penological goal of
managing deviance that is presumed. As Feeley and Simon note, this kind of
pessimism insulates the criminal justice system from criticism based upon its
failure to meet external performance measures grounded in "messy, hard-to-
control" social and economic factors. 188 In contrast, the new penology relies
upon performance measures that are internally generated, and therefore far
easier to control such as conformity with "technocratic" parole conditions.
Feeley and Simon cite waning concern over recidivism as paradigmatic of
the new penology at work. Whereas parole revocation was traditionally a
measure of correctional failure (i.e., failed rehabilitation and reintegration of
the offender into the community), it is increasingly viewed as a measure of
success because it functions to bring chronic offenders back under the control
of the correctional system. 189
The objectives of the immigration system have similarly been redefined.
They are now closely aligned with the new objectives of the criminal justice
system: managing dangerous populations, and doing so through internally
generated performance measures that provide greater insulation from criti-
cism based on the system's failure to meet messy, socially- and economically-
based performance measures imposed from without. Examples of these new
objectives within immigration law abound. They include the abandonment of
(1) assimilation and (2) the elimination of illegal entry as key immigration
objectives, as well as (3) the targeting of legal aliens (in addition to illegal
immigrants and criminal aliens) as a "dangerous" population to be managed.
1. Abandoning assimilation as a key objective of immigration regulation
The evolution of U.S. immigration policy since its inception is distinct
from the historical narrative supporting the rise of rehabilitation and clinical
treatment of criminal offenders. Yet there are notable similarities. Assimilat-
ing the immigrant' 90 has long served as the functional equivalent of rehabili-
tating the criminal offender. Just as the modern penal subject was presumed
to undergo a process of personal transformation in the penitentiary, so too
was the immigrant traditionally expected to assimilate to American cultural
and social traditions and, in doing so, transform herself from an unknown,
188. Feeley & Simon, supra note 158, at 456.
189. Id. at 455.
190. When I speak of assimilating the immigrant, I am referring to a particular model of
assimilation-melting pot assimilation-that correlates to theories of racial assimilation met with
skepticism today, that presume a kind of natural progression by which immigrants abandon ties to
their native land by adopting U.S. cultural and social values, dispersing themselves among
"Americans" and mastering and using the English language almost exclusively. In completing this
progression the assumption was that the immigrant could work his way up the ladder to success.
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potentially dangerous outsider with foreign loyalties to a culturally familiar,
non-threatening member of the national community. Measures of the success
of this model of immigration (and of the immigrant's personal transforma-
tion) included the immigrant's ability and willingness to speak and write in
English, Anglicization of the spelling of one's name, residential dispersion
among non-immigrants and in some cases, religious conversion.
However, after the 1965 Act abolished the national origins quota system
and the new preference system reconfigured the basis upon which immi-
grants were admitted to the U.S., many more immigrants were admitted to
the U.S. The immigrants of the 1960's and beyond were racially and
ethnically distinct from the vast majority of immigrants of the preceding era.
Southeast Asian refugees clustered in California and other West Coast
regions, Mexican immigrants demanded bilingual education and Cuban
refugees dug a political enclave in Miami, Florida. As they did so, the public
grew increasingly skeptical that the goal of assimilating these new immi-
grants was achievable. The goal of assimilation was made more elusive by
"messy, hard-to-control" social and economic factors that had as much to do
with characteristics of the immigrant groups themselves as changes that had
occurred within U.S. culture and society.
Since the mid-1980's, the immigration system has progressively aban-
doned the objective of assimilation, assumed the indigestibility of recent
immigrants and refugees, and focused increasingly upon the task of manag-
ing inassimilable and therefore presumptively unknowable, unruly and
dangerous immigrants. Like the criminal justice system, the immigration
system has defaulted to methods of managing immigrants whose success is
judged by internally generated performance measures that are easier to
control.
First, immigrants are increasingly managed through incapacitation. The
INS has adopted incapacitation, and abandoned deterrence, as a strategy for
dealing with illegal aliens and non-citizens with past criminal convictions. In
doing so, it overwhelmingly relies upon "body counts" (numbers of non-
citizens in custody) to measure the success of immigration law enforce-
ment.191 Consistent with the new penology, these body counts are internally
generated performance measures unhinged from the messy, hard-to-control
factors such as economic incentives to attempt reentry in spite of the high
cost of failure or social incentives to reunite with family members even at the
risk of re-imprisonment.
Feeley and Simon assert that the criminal justice system abandoned the
goal of eliminating crime in favor of managing the risk that criminal deviants
191. Criticizing the INS's exclusive focus on incapacitation, Robert Bach, former INS commis-
sioner contends that the proper policy response "should focus as much on recidivism and efforts to
prevent it as it does on maximizing 'body counts' that too frequently and easily become performance
measures for enforcement activities." Bach, supra, note 9, at 11.
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present and making it tolerable through systemic coordination. Likewise,
changes in legal responses to illegal border crossing and unauthorized reentry
attest to a profound change in the objectives of immigration law and policy.
2. Abandoning the elimination of illegal entry and reentry as a key
objective of immigration regulation
(a) Illegal entry
In the decade preceding September 11, 2001, the inability of the immigra-
tion system to stop illegal border crossing was virtually conceded. In the face
of this failure, the immigration system embraced the more realistic objective
of managing the risk that illegal aliens present and making the risk tolerable
through systematic coordination. One example of this is California's Proposi-
tion 187. Although at first glance the objective of Proposition 187-a product
of a populist anti-immigrant political groundswell across the Western States-
appears to be the inhibition of illegal border crossing in the Southwest, astute
observers have discerned a different objective. As Eve Epstein observed in a
three-part series on illegal immigration for the Boston Globe, even as
Californians voted overwhelmingly to deny public services to undocumented
workers and their families, they were deeply invested in the amenities
immigrant labor (much of it undocumented) provided: cheap car washes,
cheap valet parking, cheap house cleaners, cheap manicures, cheap childcare,
and cheap gardeners. As economist Paul Krugman noted, Proposition 187
was aimed not so much at excluding or expelling the undocumented as
keeping the cost of the amenities provided by undocumented laborers low. 1
92
Michael Peter Smith, a University of California professor who studied the
fallout from Proposition 187 commented that Californians wanted to have it
both ways: to allow as much cheap labor into the country as possible, but at
all costs to avoid reproducing any social welfare benefits, including public
education.193 This is consistent with Daniel Kanstroom's observation about
the punitive immigration regime that the United States is simultaneously
admitting and removing more non-citizens than ever before. 1
94
(b) Illegal reentry
Changes in the legal consequences of unauthorized reentry since 1996
similarly attest to a profound shift in the objectives of the immigration
system. Unauthorized re-entry of aliens who were previously deported is a
problem that took on increased urgency in the mid-1990's as the volume of
192. "Prop. 187 does not directly push immigrants out. It simply says we will not spend any
money on them, 'but an El Salvadoran can still cut your grass even if his children are illiterate."
Epstein, supra note 181 (quoting Paul Krugman).
193. Id.
194. See Kanstroom, supra note 22.
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non-citizens deported from the United States rose dramatically. However, the
significance of high rates of unauthorized reentry has taken on a new
meaning. Before the mid-1990's when eliminating illegal immigration was a
demonstrable goal of the immigration system, the apprehension of large
numbers of illegal reentrants (many of whom were subject only to a civil
order of deportation by the INS at the time) was considered a sign of failure.
However, in 1996, illegal reentry became a federal offense punishable by
stiff criminal sentences. 195 Now a high frequency of prosecutions for illegal
reentry, and a rising population of illegal immigrants in federal prisons, is
considered evidence of the effectiveness of imprisonment as a means of
containing the threat illegal reentrants present to national security.
3. Embracing heightened scrutiny of legal immigrants
The events of September 11 th reinforced the shift in the objectives of
immigration regulation. The terrorist attacks by AI-Qaeda members on
September 1 1th focused scrutiny on additional categories of non-U.S. citi-
zens. After 9/11, not only were criminal aliens and refugees being managed,
but for the first time, legal aliens-non-immigrant visa holders, foreign
students, and others-were seen as presenting a grave risk to national
security. More specifically, legal immigrants from Arab countries with large
Muslim populations. Indeed, the preventive detention of over 1200 immi-
grants of Arab descent in jails and federal lockup facilities across the country
without regard for the legality or illegality of their presence-in other words,
criminal law enforcement agents assisting INS agents in apprehending
"suspicious" immigrants, many of whom were lawfully in the country and
had committed neither a crime nor violated the civil law of immigration-
treated immigrants of Arab descent as an undifferentiated threat to national
security (on the basis of their ethnic ancestry). Special registration has carried
it one step further by requiring non-immigrant visitors from a range of
countries linked to terrorism to be fingerprinted and photographed by the
INS.
C. New Techniques
Finally, the new penology replaces traditional techniques of clinically
treating and rehabilitating criminal deviance with more cost-effective forms
195. Non-citizens who reenter the United States after exclusion, deportation or removal are
subject to a sentence of two years in federal prison and a $1000 fine. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). For criminal
aliens the penalty is substantially greater. Reentry after the commission of three or more misdemean-
ors involving drugs, crimes against the person or both, or after the commission of a felony subjects
the criminal alien to a 10-year sentence. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1). For aggravated felons, the penalty is
much more severe. Reentry of a non-citizen after conviction of an aggravated felony is punishable by
20 years in prison. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). And finally, the most severe reentry penalty is reserved for
criminal aliens who are excluded, deported or removed as alien terrorists. They are subject to a
10-year non-concurrent penalty. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(3)-(4).
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of custody and control that optimize the identification and classification of
risk. Paradigmatic of these new techniques is the rise of incapacitation as the
predominant model of punishment; selective incapacitation in particular.
Consistent with the pessimism that no real hope exists for reforming criminal
offenders, incapacitation holds no ambition more complex than detaining
offenders for a time and in doing such forestalling the inevitable resumption
of criminal activity upon release. Selective incapacitation simply pegs the
length of detention to a level of risk determined on the basis of the nature of
the criminal offense (rather than the character or social circumstances of the
offender).
The shift toward wide scale detention of many different classes of
non-U.S. citizens, and their subsequent deportation, has received the most
attention among the recent harsh immigration reforms. The heavy reliance
upon confinement and expulsion exemplifies the new penology on several
levels. It attests to a loss of faith in other techniques for preventing
immigration violations such as deterrence and rehabilitation. The INS's
broad policy of confinement followed by expulsion from the country attests
to the increasing importance of incapacitation and a declining emphasis on
recidivism and its prevention. As Robert Bach, former commissioner of the
INS points out in the context of detention and removal of criminal aliens,
"removal from the streets to detention or from the US to a home country does
not necessarily solve the problem."' 96 Once abroad there are strong incen-
tives for the deported criminal alien to attempt re-entry (an immigration
violation that was criminalized by IIRAIRA and now subjects the violator to
criminal imprisonment). Indeed, illegal aliens whose only "crime" is illegal
re-entry become acclimated to crime and prison culture through their
experience of imprisonment, and therefore more likely to resort to serious
crimes (as opposed to criminalized immigration violations) upon release.
VI. THE NEW PENOLOGY AT WORK IN THE WAR ON TERROR
The focus of this paper is the new penology as it functions within recent
immigration reforms. Concern about terrorism has been an undeniable and
consistent factor in the adoption of many of these recent reforms, but most
particularly salient in the reforms adopted after September 11, 2001. Yet the
full consideration of terrorism and its implications for the new penology is
beyond the scope of this Article. Thus, I will offer only a survey of some of
the key issues that arise when one views anti-terrorism legislation and
policies adopted after 9/11 through the lens of the new penology.
Anti-terrorism initiatives both reproduce and reconfigure the new penol-
ogy. The War on Terror was launched from the platform of a hybrid
crime/immigration system that was developed to control illegal immigrants
196. Bach, supra note 9, at 11.
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and criminal aliens. As I developed earlier in this paper, the hybrid crime/
immigration control system substantially reproduces the new penology. Not
only does it introduce new objectives, discourses and techniques into the
regulation of immigration, but also it governs immigration matters through
crime. Yet, when the potent and focused objective of uncovering, punishing
and ultimately eliminating terrorism is added to the managerial, risk distrib-
uting function of the new penology, a different system of social control
emerges. Within the hybrid system of crime/immigration control which I
described earlier, the suppression of terrorism-a type of hyper-crime linked
to foreigners-both draws upon and diverges from the New Penology within
criminal punishment and immigration control practices.
The U.S. govemment initiated a threefold response to the terrorist attacks
on September 1 1th. It mobilized crime-fighting tools to uncover and punish
those who perpetrated and abetted the perpetrators of the attacks. Those tools
included the criminal prosecutions of Zacariah Moussaui 97 and John Walker
Lindh, (the so-called "American Al Qaeda"), the deputizing of state and local
law enforcement officers to perform certain immigration law enforcement
functions, and the monitoring of communications between inmates and other
detainees in federal custody and their attorneys where such communications
are suspected of being used to facilitate violence or terrorism. The govern-
ment also mobilized a military response that included a military attack on the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan ("Operation Enduring Freedom"), the deten-
tion of captured Al Qaeda members at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, military tribunals and the indefinite detention of "enemy combat-
ants." Lastly, the government mobilized immigration control tools that
included beefing up security along US borders, requiring men from Arab and
Muslim nations to register upon entering and leaving the U.S., extending the
length of time for which a non-citizen may be detained by immigration
authorities without a warrant, and limiting the ability of immigration judges
to release immigration detainees in certain cases when immigration officials
have opposed bond or set a high bond.' 98
1. Anti-terrorism initiatives reproduce the new penology and govern
through crime
Since 9/11, the war on terror has drawn upon and perpetuated many of the
same managerial strategies and techniques used in recent anti-crime initia-
tives such as the war on drugs, and the crackdown on illegal and criminal
aliens. First, it has relied heavily upon incapacitation as a means of increas-
ing security and reducing risks to public safety. The preventive detention of
nearly 1200 Muslim men and/or men of Arab descent immediately after
197. The so-called 2 0 1h terrorist.
198. See 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1708 (Nov. 5, 2001).
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September 1 1th demonstrated that reliance, as does the continued detention of
non-citizens in (even minor) violation of immigration law, and the continued
detention of Al Qaeda suspects at Guantanamo Bay. Second, the war on terror
has implemented zero-tolerance policies similar to those popularized by the
war on drugs. Characteristic of the crackdown on illegal and criminal aliens,
the War on Terrorism has also blurred the distinctions between criminal and
immigration law enforcement by detaining and arresting terror suspects with
tools from the arsenals of both systems, namely material witness warrants
designed to compel testimony from frightened or reluctant witnesses in
criminal proceedings,' 99 and detention based upon immigration violations
which INS officers arQ authorized to initiate when they have probable cause
to believe an alien is in the U.S. in violation of the law.20 0 In addition, racial
profiling-used in the warrantless apprehension of both disproportionately
large numbers of African American and Hispanic drug crime suspects in
traffic stops and of Mexican-looking workers in border area INS raids-has
been popularly revived in the security screening of airplane passengers.
Terrorism has simultaneously been defined as an immigration problem,2 0'
a crime problem, 02 and a problem of national defense requiring military
intervention.2 0 3 Anti-terrorism initiatives link the regulation of immigration,
crime control and the authority of the military through the objective of
protecting national security. The nature of the attacks of September 1 1th
infused ordinary law enforcement with the heightened objective of protecting
national security. Currently, national security pervades all aspects of the
regulation of criminals and non-citizens through the hybrid crime-immigra-
tion control system that the two converging systems have created. The new
objective of this system is to clean out a range of undesirable people,
regardless of citizenship status, through criminally punitive means. National
security also accomplishes this new objective of social sanitization more
successfully than older, discredited devices because national security comes
in below the constitutional radar screen (in much the same way as convict
leasing as a form of criminal punishment functioned as a surrogate for slave
labor after slavery was outlawed).
199. See 18 U.S.C. § 3144.
200. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2).
201. The fact that the September I th hijackers were out of status on student visas highlighted the
vulnerability of the U.S. to terrorists who take advantage of the relatively lax enforcement of
immigration compliance.
202. As early as 1988, the Bush Administration responded to the Lockerbie bombing in a
legalistic fashion, eventually bringing to trial two Libyan suspects in the Netherlands. Subsequently,
the Clinton Administration chose to deal with the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000 and the 1993
bombing of the World Trade Center as problems of law enforcement. The idea was that defining
terrorism as criminal activity would "depoliticize" and "delegitimate" it. John Lancaster, Comproinis-
ing Positions, WASH. POST, July 9, 2000, at WI0 (quoting State Department Counterterrorism Chief,
Michael A. Sheehan).




By elevating national security to the highest priority of the hybrid
crime/immigration control system, anti-terrorism initiatives are governing
through crime. First, the overlay of national security as the highest objective
of the crime/immigration control system governs through crime by treating
formerly distinct problems of law enforcement and foreign relations as
unitary crime problems, and bringing military resources to bear on newly
defined arenas of crime control and, conversely, bringing the traditional
resources of crime control to bear on matters of international foreign
relations. The most salient example since 9/11 is the linkage between
international drug trafficking and terrorism-so called "narco-terrorism." As
a result of this linkage, informants for the Drug Enforcement Agency are
providing intelligence on terrorist cells, 204 the U.S. military is retraining its
troops to fight small conflicts against borderless groups engaging in crime as
they plan acts of terror, °5 and the federal government undertook an expen-
sive and unprecedented television ad campaign to get the message out that
the casual use of illegal drugs supports terrorism. 2 0 6 Other examples of the
deployment of hybrid resources abound.20 7
Second, anti-terrorism initiatives govern through crime by justifying and
renewing past, discredited practices within crime control and immigration
regulation. For example, after decades of litigation challenging racial discrimi-
nation against Haitian immigrants in singling them out for detention while
Cuban refugees are customarily granted parole, anti-terror policy has pro-
vided a new justification for detaining Haitian Refugees. The practice of
automatically detaining Haitian refugees was largely discredited in the
1990's due to the fact many Haitian refugees made out credible claims for
asylum and international law disfavors the detention of asylum-seekers. But
the imprisonment of Haitian boatpeople has re-emerged as a device for social
ordering since the inception of the War on Terrorism. 2° 8 The newest justifica-
tion offered by the federal government for the unequal use of indefinite
detention against undocumented Haitian refugees who enter the U.S. by sea
(when Cuban refugees are paroled into the country), is that national security
requires such a harsh policy to "prevent the diversion of border enforcement
efforts, 2 0 9 and to prevent the Coast Guard and other agencies from being
distracted from their homeland defense role.2 '0 Now Haitian refugees find
204. James Dao, The War on Terrorism Takes Aim at Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, at 5.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Neighborhood crime watch groups are being encouraged by law enforcement agencies to be
on the lookout for terrorist activity. Ryan Davis, Crime Watch Meeting Shifts Focus to Terrorism, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 29, 2002, at 4.
208. Donald Kerwin, National Security and Immigrant Rights, THE NATION, Dec. 19, 2002,
available at http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i =20030106&s = kerwin.
209. Tanya Weinberg, Activists Press for Policy Shift; U.S. Urged to Ease Detention for Haiti
Refugees, S. FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 27, 2002, at 3B.
210. Madeline Baro Diaz, Influx of Refugees Seen as a Tax on Social Services, S. FLORIDA
SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 9, 2002, at 14A.
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themselves being imprisoned again, this time under a "national security"-
based logic that has been characterized by critics as "strained." ''
Another example is the renewal of racial profiling as a law enforcement
practice. Racial profiling emerged as a high-profile issue of law enforcement
practice in the early 1980's when it was routinely employed in the War on
Drugs. Racial profiling has been defined as "the practice of stopping and
inspecting people who are passing through public places - such as drivers on
public highways or pedestrians in airports or urban areas - where the reason
for the stop is a statistical profile of the detainee's race or ethnicity.,2 12 It has
been challenged extensively by minority groups, African Americans and
Latinos in particular, who police routinely profile as drug users and traffick-
ers. Until September l1th, 2001, the practice of racial profiling had been
largely discredited. Presidential candidate George W. Bush even pledged to
do away with the practice as a campaign promise. 1 3 Many law enforcement
agencies revised their policies to narrowly curtail or eliminate the practice.
As the War on Terrorism governs through crime, it simultaneously accom-
plishes the objective of removing a wide range of socially undesirable
people, regardless of citizenship status, through criminally punitive means.
And it has been able to transcend the limitation on the immigration system to
control only the expulsion of non-citizens. For example, record numbers of
legal immigrants are fleeing the country in fear of being incarcerated and
deported for minor, technical violations of immigration regulations. This has
largely occurred after the initiation of Special Registration 21 4 pursuant to the
USA PATRIOT Act, designed to track the whereabouts of Muslim and Arab
men as they enter and leave the United States.
2. Anti-terrorism initiatives reconfigure the new penology
Terrorism as we view it today-loosely defined as a violent attack by a
semi-clandestine organization, the goal of which is to intimidate a govern-
ment or civil population in furtherance of political or social objectives-was
not historically treated as a crime. Therefore, the entire post-Enlightenment
transformation of the penal system into a process led by the rehabilitative
ideal that constitutes the historical landscape for a later series of shifts in
penal practices that began in the mid-1970's and through which the new
penology emerged are less relevant to terrorism. As a crime, there is not even
211. Donald Kerwin, supra note 208.
212. Gene Callahan & William Anderson, The Roots of Racial Profiling, REASONONLINE,
Aug.-Sept. 2001, available at http://www.reason.com/0108/fe.gc.the.shtml.
213. In his February address to Congress, President George W. Bush reported that he had asked
Attorney General John Ashcroft " 'to develop specific recommendations to end racial profiling. It's
wrong, and we will end it in America.' " Id.
214. Under the Special Registration provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, all males 16 and older
from 25 countries (24 of which are predominantly Islamic) who are present within the United States
must register with the immigration service or risk being locked up and eventually deported from the
United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1302 et seq. (2003).
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international consensus on what constitutes terrorism. Terrorism has been
defined simultaneously as a domestic crime, an international crime, a war
crime215 and a crime against humanity. Hardly the stuff of managing low
level drug offenders through risk distributing punishments that exploded the
prison population and prompted, in part, Feeley and Simon's initial inquiry
into changing penal objectives, technique and strategies. 216
The war on terrorism is a highly focused campaign being waged with tools
from the arsenals of immigration control, crime control and national defense
(the military). Initiatives undertaken to combat terrorism are a product of a
very deliberate response to acts of terrorist violence that have occurred in, or
against, the United States, including the bombing of the World Trade Center
in 1993, the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000 and the attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 2001.
In contrast, the new penology is a model of a new system of social control
that is not reducible to any single reigning ideology 217 or set of principles.
The new penology seeks to manage risk rather than to eliminate it. However,
when one combines the new techniques, discourses and objectives of the new
penology with the highly focused objective of eliminating terrorism, the new
penology ceases to be managerial, and is transformed into a very different
system of social control. One way of understanding the impact of anti-
terrorism and its national security imperative on the new penology is to
observe how concerns about terrorism have transformed the policing of
minority communities, the investigation of domestic crime and the treatment
of penal subjects.
Prior to 9/11, international terrorism (terrorism masterminded by foreign-
ers), domestic terrorism (such as the acts of Timothy McVeigh and groups
like the Michigan Militia) and domestic crime were fairly distinct categories.
Law enforcement approached the threats posed by Al-Qaeda, the Michigan
Militia and street criminals very differently. After 9/11, immigration was
used as an important vehicle for controlling international terrorism princi-
pally because the people who hijacked airplanes and used them as missiles
were Saudis under the direction of Osama bin Laden admitted into the United
States through our immigration agency. Controlling immigration was thought
to be the most important strategy for preventing terrorism. Indeed the
preventive detention that took place in the weeks following 9/11 concen-
trated on taking into custody Arab nationals residing in the U.S. 218 Large
Arab immigrant communities within major U.S. cities were targeted. The
reduced rights enjoyed by non-U.S. citizens permitted the INS to detain these
215. The United Nations has accepted the definition of "terrorism" as a "peacetime war crime".
216. Feeley & Simon, supra note 158, at 4.
217. Id.
218. Dante Chinni, Wide FBI Dragnet Turns up Leads, but also Criticism, CHRISTIAN SCt.
MONITOR, Oct. 15, 2001 at 2.
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219individuals in secrecy, without notice and without publishing their names.
Not until the FBI tied six Americans living in Lackawanna, NY to the Al
Farooq training camp in Afghanistan did the focus on terrorism shift to US
citizens. 220 African Americans-the usual suspects in the domestic policing
of crime-breathed a sigh of relief that the manhunt was focused on
brown-skinned people with straight black hair. Frequent victims of racial
profiling for domestic crime and overrepresented in the prison population,
they were relieved that investigating terrorism would not be added to the
inventory of excuses law enforcement authorities employ to legitimate racial
harassment. Just as the U.S. became accustomed to the menacing mugshot-
like images of brown-skinned, black-haired young men of clearly Middle
Eastern descent plastered on the front pages of the papers, the paradigm
suddenly shifted. The FBI uncovered an alleged terrorist cell in Portland,
Oregon that included three Black Muslims. 22' The brown-skinned, kinky-
haired mugshots of Jeffrey Leon Battle, his ex-wife October Martinique and
Patrice Lumumba Ford were plastered on the front-page of the New York
Times alongside several other suspects of Arab descent. Investigating interna-
tional terrorism immediately became synonymous with tracking the activities
of radical Black Muslims.
The link between minority communities in the United States and the
investigation of international terrorism is more obvious when we consider
the institution in which radical Black Islam flourished 30 years ago, and
where even today, many African Americans find Allah-prison. Prisons,
and the many African Americans incarcerated in them, are now inextrica-
bly caught up in the crime/terror continuum of social control. The prison
unrest that gave rise to the Prisoners' Rights Movement was in large part
activated by Black Panthers and other black radicals arrested and incarcer-
ated for violent opposition to racial subordination. Indeed, in 1969, J.
Edgar Hoover publicly stated that the Panthers are the" 'greatest threat to
the internal security of the country.' ,,222 Now our greatest threat is
terrorism. And because prisoners have far fewer rights than the non-
convicted, it is far easier to subject them to surveillance, etc. The
apprehension of Jose Padillo, alleged to have plotted to detonate a "dirty
bomb" and Richard C. Reid, the "Shoe Bomber" alleged to have at-
tempted to blow up a plane on its way from Paris to Antigua (via Miami)
last year, further attests to the link between communities of color and the
investigation of international terrorism. Padillo, a U.S. citizen of Puerto
Rican ethnicity, also converted to Islam while incarcerated. Reid, a
219. Deborah Barfield, America's Ordeal; Critics Wary of Bid to Curtail Rights, NEWSDAY, Oct.
2, 2001, at A4.
220. John Kifner & Marc Santora, Threats and Responses: Suspects; EB.I. Makes 6th Arrest in
Buffalo Inquiry, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2002, at A 12.
221. Chisun Lee, A Smaller Stick, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 24, 2002, at 22.
222. Salim Muwakkil, Black Panthers Reconsidered, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 28, 2000, at 11.
[Vol. 17:611
CITIZENSHIP & SEVERITY
British citizen whose father is a black Jamaican, converted to Islam in
prison as well.
Now, domestic crime is being scrutinized closely for links to terrorism.
Immigration plays an important role in that scrutiny. For example, when John
Mohammed and John Malvo were arrested for arguably the most atypical
serial killing spree ever profiled, the media seized onto the fact that Malvo
was released from INS custody after he was discovered to have no documen-
tation that he was legally in the country. Media pundits criticized the INS and
the porosity of our borders as it did in the wake of 9/11 when the agency
renewed the visas of some of the highijackers. Furthermore, law enforcement
officials questioned immigration officials in Antigua to determine whether
Mohammed and Malvo had ties to "shoe bomber" Richard Reid by virtue of
the fact that they resided on the island for a common period of time.223
The probable consequences of the link between international terrorism and
domestic crime are manifold. First, national security will be increasingly
employed as a justification for surveillance and detention of poor urban
communities of color.
Second, prisons will become sites for obtaining intelligence on terrorism,
and increasingly national security will regulate the practice of Islam in
prisons rather than "legitimate penological objectives."
Traditionally, religious practices in prison are governed by constitutional
law. Although the standard for review of impingements on religious practices
by prisoners has varied in the past twenty years, the current standard of
review is the "rational basis" test. Restrictions that bear some reasonable
relation to legitimate penological objectives pass constitutional scrutiny.
Although an admittedly low standard of review, it is possible to imagine a
national security based standard that eviscerates the constitutional standard
altogether. This lower standard would subject Black Muslim prisoners to
greater surveillance and discipline and be a perfect tool for investigating
criminal and disciplinary infractions committed in prison.
VII. CONCLUSION
The past two decades have witnessed profound shifts in the U.S. immigra-
tion law and policy. As public tolerance for illegal immigrants and refugees
waned, immigration law became even more harsh and criminally punitive.
This paper links criminally punitive immigration reforms enacted over the
past two decades to new strategic formations within immigration law that are
consistent with the new penology. In demonstrating how these harsh,
punitive new reforms reproduce the new penology, I contend that a new
hybrid crime/immigration system of social control has formed that reconfig-
ures both the crime and immigration control systems by "criminalizing"
223. Allan Lengel, Sniper Rifle Was Also Used In Ala. Killing, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2002, at Al.
2003]
666 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:611
immigration law, and making the criminal law-like immigration law-
more administrative and less judicially reviewable. Ultimately, this hybrid
crime/immigration control system has the potential, when combined with the
highly focused political objective of eliminating the threat of terrorism, to
dramatically impact the nature of penal supervision and spawn a potent, new
system of social control premised upon protecting national security.
